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Antimonopoly in American Public Land Law
MICHAEL C. BLUMM*
KARA TEBEAU**
ABSTRACT
American public land law is often thought to be divided into historical eras such as the
Disposition Era, the Reservation Era, and what we call the modern era. We think that an
overarching theme throughout all public land law eras is antimonopoly. Antimonopoly policy has
permeated public land law for the more than two-and-a-half centuries since the United States’
founding. In this article, we show the persistence of antimonopoly sentiment throughout the history
of American public land law, from the Confederation Congress to Jacksonian America to the
Progressive Conservation Era and into the modern era.
Antimonopoly policy led to widespread ownership of American land, perhaps America’s chief
distinction from England and Europe. The policy fostered acreage limits in federal grants, a
preference for bona fide settlers and, eventually, an evolution from land sales to free land under
the Homestead Act. Antimonopoly principles were also present in public timber, mining, and
rangeland policies from the earliest days. In the Progressive Conservation Era, antimonopoly
fueled a public land withdrawal and reservation movement, landmark leasing and licensing
programs that maintained public control over fuel minerals and waterways, and the first explicit
federal policy concern over future generations. The modern era has seen the codification of
multiple use management, the enactment of comprehensive land planning statutes, and the rise of
species concerns, among other antimonopoly policies.
Although antimonopoly policies seem to be under some threat from recent Congresses, a turn
toward monopoly would amount to a renunciation of centuries of public land policy. This history
strongly counsels against these proposals. However imperfectly realized on the ground,
antimonopoly has always been a cardinal feature of public land law and policy. Antimonopoly is
in fact deeply embedded in the nation’s identity as a reflection of republican values of
individualism and equal opportunity.
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I. INTRODUCTION

John Locke maintained that an individual can acquire as much property “as any one can make
use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in:
whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.” 1 When mixed with his
labor, it becomes his, and no other person has a right to it, “at least where there is as enough, and
as good left in common for others.” 2 American political thinkers interpreted these Lockean
appropriation principles as limits on the amount of property that could be individually privatized
in order to ensure equitable sharing, and criticized speculators.3 Locke’s ideas—bedrock principles
of the Founding generation 4 —promoted the antimonopoly ideal of widespread use. 5 Jefferson
grounded his agrarian ethic in Locke’s interpretation of the laws of nature: “Whenever there is in
* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School.
** J.D. cum laude 2015, Lewis and Clark Law School, Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law.
1
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 31 (1690).
2
Id. § 27.
3
See generally Richard J. Ellis, Radical Lockeanism in American Political Culture, 45 W. POL. Q. 825 (1992)
(describing the egalitarian interpretation of Lockeanism espoused by Thomas Paine, Jacksonian Democrats,
populists, and others).
4
See CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 27
(1922) (explaining that “So far as the ‘Fathers’ were, before 1776, directly influenced by particular writers, the
writers were English, and notably Locke. . . . [T]he Declaration [of Independence] in its form, in its phraseology,
follows closely certain sentences in Locke’s [S]econd [T]reatise on [G]overnment.”).
5
See KAREN IVERSON VAUGHN, JOHN LOCKE: ECONOMIST AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 59 (1980) (describing Locke’s
distrust of monopolistic privilege); LOCKE, supra note 1, § 36 (“Nature did well in setting limits to private property
through limits to how much men can work and limits to how much they need. No man’s labour could tame or
appropriate all the land; no man’s enjoyment could consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for
any man in this way to infringe on the right of another, or acquire a property to the disadvantage of his neighbor . . .
.”).
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any country uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been
so far extended as to violate natural right. The small land holders are the most precious part of a
state.”6 Thus he, other Founders, and their successors sought to implement policies that would
avoid monopolization of public land and associated natural resources and put them instead into the
hands of numerous users, fostering both egalitarianism and democracy.
Antimonopoly principles pervade the history of federal natural resources management, which
is rife with examples of limits on the terms, amounts, types of interest, and conditions imposed on
the privatization of public resources.7 Limiting private property rights in public resources allowed
for their widespread distribution,8 the mixing of private and public uses, and possible reversion to
the public for failure to perform specified conditions. In numerous ways, the federal government
retained property interests for the public when disposing of public lands and resources in order to
promote broad-based resource sharing and avoid monopolization.9
This article illustrates how public land law has consistently reflected a philosophy of
distributional equity in allocating public resources, a philosophy that is at the heart of American
democratic thought. Long before and well after Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act,10
public land policy attempted to limit private acquisition of public resources to prevent monopoly
and avoid speculation. This policy was sometimes overcome in practice by monopolistic forces.
Nevertheless, antimonopoly has been a persistent theme throughout the history of American public
land law.
We consider five stages of the development of the antimonopolistic impulse in public land law.
Part II of this article begins with a discussion of the first federal land ordinances, which rejected
concentrated land ownership and initiated a tradition of protecting navigable waters as public
highways. Part III recounts the era of federal land disposition through homesteading and the rise
of the anti-railroad-monopoly movement, explaining a decades-long evolution of land policies
6

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 13, 1776), cited in PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC
LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 62 (Public Land Law Rev. Comm’n 1968).
7
David Schorr has argued that the historical private/commons formula does not adequately explain the American
democratic ideal of distributive justice in natural resources. DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER
RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 7, 30–31 (2012) (discussing the
origins of Western water rights in Colorado and arguing that “[t]he Lockean and Jeffersonian view of acquisition
from the public domain, requiring work as a condition of appropriation and limiting the scope of rights to the
amount a person could directly use, led directly to the requirement for water claims, both in its direct form and
indirectly through the miners’ laws’ limits on appropriations calibrated to the amount one person could reasonably
use; and the abrogation of riparian ownership [the Eastern system of water rights] . . . was a manifestation of antimonopolism and anti-speculation ideology, directed against the potential concentration of water wealth in the hands
of those who could afford to buy up the riparian lands of the arid-country streams.”). This article discusses how that
Lockean impulse influenced American public land disposition and use over time.
8
For example, the dominant view of water rights in the American West, as David Schorr noted, is that the
privatization of water rights in the Western “first in time, first in right” system reflected a natural capitalist transition
from public resource to private property. Id. at 7. However, Schorr’s account of the rise of water appropriation
principles in Colorado included a strong element of equitable distribution, as embodied in the concept of beneficial
use, which limited the scope of rights to the amount a person could directly use—an antimonopolistic, antispeculative sentiment which arose out of the codes of Colorado’s mining districts. Id. at 7, 30-31. Schorr’s account
revealed that the Colorado Doctrine of water rights was more concerned with preventing concentrated control over
water than with encouraging private wealth maximization.
9
See infra notes 276–80, 316–21, 414–15 (describing leasing systems, permitting schemes, and surface access
provisions).
10
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1890)).
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from large sales to free grants of a limited acreage to yeoman farmers and bona fide settlers. Part
IV describes the roots of American policies toward managing extractive resources—a progression
including leasing, term limits, acreage limitations, diligent pursuit requirements, and protection of
public access to the public domain. Part V considers the evolution of antimonopoly policies during
the Progressive Era, including the rise of resource conservation and the first concern for
intergenerational equity. Part VI briefly assesses some modern public land laws, examining the
ways in which they promote widespread use by diverse users, limit commercially extractive uses
on certain lands, require land planning,11 and uphold public access to the public lands.
We conclude that the antimonopoly impulse has been a persistent, core element of American
public land law for more than two centuries, spreading the benefits of public natural resources
widely and promoting something resembling egalitarian wealth distribution. Over the years, two
major dimensions of antimonopoly have emerged: policies promoting (1) widespread resource
ownership and use, as opposed to concentrating resources in the hands of the few; and (2) multiple
uses of public lands, instead of single uses. Today, antimonopoly sentiment continues to emphasize
intergenerational equity and has expanded its focus to embrace wildlife, including habitat
concerns. However, private rights to public property are commonly renewed and protected by
bureaucratic inertia. 12 And the paradigm of multiple-use affords land managers virtually
unreviewable administrative discretion. 13 In recent years, Congress has frequently entertained
monopolistic policy proposals, a development that would roll back centuries of antimonopoly
policy and undermine cardinal features of the American character. Although now under significant
threat, the antimonopoly impulse has remained a consistent feature of American public land law
throughout its long history.
II. FROM A “BLANK SLATE”: THE ORDINANCES OF 1785 AND 1787
After the United States proclaimed independence, the new nation had to decide how to treat
the land west of the Appalachian Mountains. The states with fixed western boundaries quickly
sought to pressure the states with western land claims—about half of the original states—to cede
their claims to the federal government.14 Beginning in 1780 with New York and culminating with
11

Advanced planning is a hallmark of antimonopoly because it designates protected and potential uses in a publicly
available and enforceable document, usually before agencies must consider specific proposals to designate areas of
public land for private or extractive uses. Land planning provides an opportunity for equal consideration of multiple
public and private uses, extractive and non-extractive. Thirty years ago, Charles Wilkinson and Michael Anderson
described the contrast between the pre-planning and the modern planning era: “Until the 1960s, resource allocation
primarily involved the allocation of resources to private commercial interests. During that decade a broader public
interest and a fuller recognition of non-commodity resources came to the fore and became firmly enshrined in
statutes and case law during the 1970s and 1980s. A requirement of comprehensive land planning has become a
central element of Congress’s determination to accord equal consideration to all resources and to open public land
policy to broader public involvement.” Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning
in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 7, 10 (1986).
12
See generally Bruce Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J. 992 (2014)
(describing, for example, non-termination of oil and gas leases, administrative acquiescence in perpetuating grazing
permits, and renewal of large private ski resort use and occupancy permits on federal lands).
13
See discussions of MUSYA, NFMA, and ANILCA, infra Parts V.A–C (describing the difficulties in enforcing
subsistence rights and wildlife diversity requirements, and challenging expansive timber sales).
14
Six states were without western land claims, including Pennsylvania, and they pressured the states with western
claims to cede them to the federal government. ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 109–10 (1905). The states without western claims argued that Congress had the authority, or should
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Georgia in 1802, all of the so-called “landed” states ceded their western claims, giving the federal
government full authority over the settlement and governance of the western lands.15 The land
disposition policies that emerged in the 1780s were oriented towards relatively large sales and
revenue production to retire the Revolutionary War debt, instead of offering free land or cheap
sales of small plots to accommodate the needs of yeoman farmers.16 But states’ western land
cessions also gave the nation its first opportunity to implement its republican ideals in land policy.
Republican government meant a government “bound by fixed laws, which people have a voice
in making, and a right to defend.”17 How would the revolutionaries create such a government of
the people? For the revolutionary generation, republicanism meant the promotion of civic virtue,
and an aversion to monarchy, oligarchy, and aristocracy. 18 In contrast to countries dominated by
monarchy and aristocracy, the republican ideal emphasized equality of political power.19 Early
republicanism relied upon equitable property distribution to do so: “an equality of property, with
a necessity of alienation, constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is the
very soul of the republic.”20 At the base of this ideal is the Lockean notion that a man is naturally
entitled to the fruits of his labor—whereas the aristocracy owned land without contributing
physical labor.21 Moreover, widely distributing property among agrarians would create a virtuous
be given the authority, to take the land for the common good. Id. Maryland threatened to not accept the Articles of
Confederation if the landed states continued to claim stretches of lands beyond the Appalachians. Id. In September
1780, Congress urged the landed states to cede their claims to it, and in turn urged Maryland to ratify the Articles.
17 JOURNALS OF CONG. 807 (Sept. 6, 1780) (“Resolved . . . that it be earnestly recommended that those states, who
have claims to the western country to . . . give their delegates in Congress such powers as may effectively remove
the only obstacle to final ratification of the Articles of Confederation; and that the legislature of Maryland be
urgently requested to . . . subscribe the said [A]rticles.”).
15
The seven landed states (and the date each initiated cession) were: New York (1780), Virginia (1781),
Massachusetts (1784), Connecticut (1786), South Carolina (1787), North Carolina (1789), and Georgia (1802).
PAYSON JACKSON TREAT, THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM, 1785-1820 14 (1910). See Atlas of the Historical
Geography of the United States, U. RICHMOND DIGITAL SCHOLARSHIP LAB,
http://dsl.richmond.edu/historicalatlas/47/b/ (use the “next” arrow to navigate through maps of the state cessions
chronologically) (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). The federal government solidified its preeminence in Western land
policy when Congress passed the Indian NonIntercourse Act in 1790, which gave the federal government exclusive
authority to deal with Indian tribes, including approving all land transactions and licensing Indian traders.
NonIntercourse Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). In Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823), the
Supreme Court essentially ratified the NonIntercourse Act’s federal primacy by upholding a federal land patentee’s
claim against speculators who bought from Indian “chiefs” prior to the enactment of the 1790 statute, invoking a socalled “doctrine of discovery.” See generally Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal
Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in Indian
Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713 (2004).
16
See Douglass North & Andrew Rutten, The Northwest Ordinance in Historical Perspective, in ESSAYS ON THE
ECONOMY OF THE OLD NORTHWEST 19, 24–25 (David Klingaman & Richard Vedder eds. 1987).
17
JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS NO. 7 (Mar. 6, 1775).
18
See generally 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION ch. 4 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 2001); James L.
Huston, The American Revolutionaries, the Political Economy of Aristocracy, and the American Concept of the
Distribution of Wealth, 1765-1900, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 1079, 1089 (1993).
19
See Huston, supra note 18, at 1080. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 70–75 (1998).
20
See Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson & the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J. OF LAW & ECON.
467, 483-84 (1976) (citing Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution
Proposed by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 29, 59 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1888)).
21
See Huston, supra note 18, at 1083.
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citizenry capable of self-government.22 In short, revolutionary-era republicans believed that those
with a personal investment in society would be the most judicious decisionmakers for it. 23
Republicanism thus carried a redistributive ideal that inspired the abolition of primogeniture, the
promotion of widespread land ownership and, later, free land grants to settlers.
Republican ideals were set into motion by the Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, the progenitors of federal public land law.24 The ordinances laid the roadmap
for settling and governing the Northwest Territory25 that the federal government obtained in the
1783 Treaty of Paris and the state land cessions.26 Key among the provisions of the 1785 ordinance
was the establishment of a grid system for surveying territorial land based on the New England
model, which created square townships.27 Surveyors laid out each township of thirty-six square
miles without regard to landscape characteristics like ravines, streams, or swamps.28 The 1785
ordinance created a system both of measurement and disposal—once the lands had been surveyed
into squares, the federal government sold them off to the highest bidder, with a minimum price of
a dollar per acre.29
Selling public land at competitive auctions might appear to conflict with the Jeffersonian ideal
of promoting democratic goals by distributing government lands widely to small farmers. In fact,
Jefferson initially opposed the idea of selling the territorial lands based on his belief that the burden
of the war should not be shouldered by those with the least ability to afford it.30 But he was willing
to compromise.31 The 1785 Ordinance included no provision for preemption either,32 meaning that
22

See Katz, supra note 20, at 475.
See Matthew J. Festa, Property and Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 446
(2013).
24
See GATES, supra note 6, at 65 (explaining that the rectangular survey system of 1785 has been retained in the
national land system ever since). Vernon Carstensen, Patterns on the American Land, 18 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF
FEDERALISM 31, 31 (1988) (stating that the federal government extended the rectangular system used in the 1785
ordinance to 1.3 billion acres in the continental U.S.).
25
See Jonathan Hughes, The Great Land Ordinances: Colonial America’s Thumbprint on History, in ESSAYS ON
THE ECONOMY OF THE OLD NORTHWEST 1, 8 (David Klingaman & Richard Vedder eds., 1987); North & Rutten,
supra note 16, at 22.
26
Treaty of Paris art. 2, Sept. 3, 1783. The survey system of the 1785 Ordinance initially applied only to a fortytwo-mile wide strip of land adjacent to the western boundary of Pennsylvania, extending north from the Ohio River.
After 1796, Congress formally re-established the survey system, which it thereafter employed on the rest of the
Northwest Territory, the Southwest Territory, the Louisiana Territory, Florida, land acquired from Mexico, the
Oregon Territory, the Gadsden Purchase, and Alaska. See Carstensen, supra note 24, at 34.
27
Ordinance of May 20, 1785, in 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONT’L CONG., 1774-1789, at 375-81 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1933) (“An Ordinance for ascertaining the mode of disposing of Lands in the Western Territory.”).
28
This grid system has been called a metaphorical “American thumbprint.” See Hughes, supra note 25, at 8. The
grid created a system of property delineation abstracted from environmental realities, and literally shaped the course
of American farming in the West, predisposing farmers to straight-line tilling, no matter what the terrain. See
Carstensen, supra note 24, at 35–38. In the dust-bowl era, the Soil Conservation Service retrained farmers to till in a
landscape-contoured fashion instead. See id. at 37; Douglas Helms, Conserving the Plains: The Soil Conservation
Service in the Great Plains, 64 AGRIC. HIST. 58, 61 (1990).
29
See GATES, supra note 6, at 65.
30
See id. at 62 (“By selling the lands to them, you will disgust them, and cause an avulsion to them from the
common union. They will settle the lands in spite of everybody.” (citing I THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 492
(Julian P. Boyd ed. 1950))).
31
See North & Rutten, supra note 16, at 25.
32
See GATES, supra note 6, at 66. Note, however, that the states implemented their own land distribution polices.
Several states issued retrospective preemption laws to give squatting settlers the option of purchase. See EDWARD T.
PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND: EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS OF OUR PRIVATE PROPERTY MOSAIC 186 (1995). States
23
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the survey-and-sale system would not recognize the right of a squatter33 to gain title to the land he
occupied without competing at auction to purchase it. 34 The Act included no anti-speculation
provisions,35 placed no limit on the amount of land individuals or companies could purchase, and
imposed no requirement that the owner reside on or improve the land.36
The 1785 Ordinance was a compromise between the needs of a post-revolutionary country that
needed to pay its war debts and the republican ideals that carried it through the war. As Paul Gates
explained, Congress wanted to end a tradition of granting large tracts of estates to aristocratic
families and quell growing hostility between tenant-farmers and estate barons.37 But the war debt
apparently precluded granting free land to small farmers. The federal government therefore
avoided the free-grant system once practiced in the southern colonies,38 and opted instead for the
survey-and-sale system.39
In 1787, Congress established a system of governance for the territory north and west of the
Ohio River.40 In many important ways, the 1787 Northwest Ordinance reflected republican ideals
in land policy. The ordinance’s basic purpose was to provide for the governance of this new
frontier, establishing the conditions for a new type of republicanism, on what was “essentially a
blank political slate.”41 Notable antimonopoly provisions of the 1787 Ordinance (1) rejected the
British system of large landed estates, (2) made it easier for more individuals to participate in the
offered their own military bounties of free land grants for soldiers and sailors. See id. at 186–87. The federal
government also offered millions of acres of land in the Northwest to Revolutionary War veterans as compensation
for their service. See Jerry A. O’Callaghan, The War Veteran and the Public Lands, 28 ARGIC. HIST. 163, 164–65
(1954).
33
“One that settles on land without a right or title.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2215
(2002) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S THIRD].
34
See GATES, supra note 6, at 66.
35
WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 33, at 2189 (“ . . . an act of speculating (as by engaging in business out of the
ordinary, by dealing with a view to making a profit from conjectural fluctuations in the price rather than from
earnings of the ordinary profit of trade . . . . )”). Speculation was a principal threat to the antimonopoly ideal.
Through speculation, buyers acted as middlemen, purchasing large tracts of land they did not intend to personally
use. Speculators purchased early, drove up prices, then made profits on resales. Alexander Hamilton supported sales
to such speculative middle-men because they would produce quick sales of the public lands and revenue to retire the
war debt. Settlers would be the eventual beneficiaries, but they would have to pay prices set by the speculators. See
Paul W. Gates, An Overview of American Land Policy, 50 AGRIC. HIST. 213, 217 (1976).
36
See GATES, supra note 6, at 66.
37
See GATES, supra note 35, at 216 (explaining that many great estates of millions of acres had been granted by the
colonies to influential families like the Penns, Calverts, Fairfaxes, and Granvilles prior to the Revolution).
38
See id. The Southern system, called the headright system, reflected the British colonial system encouraging
migration to the colonies. See PRICE, supra note 32, at 106–07. In Virginia, each settler could receive fifty acres,
while a settler could get between 6 and 150 acres in other colonies. Id. Grant sizes were not socially egalitarian, as
grants were often greater for free settlers than servants, for men than women, servants than free men, and for adults
than children. Moreover, usually the person who paid the indentured servant’s way received the servant’s share of
the land, although most colonies provided an equal share for a servant when he was freed. See id. at 107–09.
39
Surveyors divided alternate townships into one-mile-square sections (or 640 acres). The federal government
would sell half the townships whole, and half the townships by sections. Thus, an initial buyer had to have enough
capital to purchase at least 640 acres. See Carstensen, supra note 24, at 34; BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A
HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 39 (1965).
40
Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 51 (1787), reprinted in 1 U.S.C., at LVII (2012) (“An Ordinance for the government
of the Territory of the United States northwest of the River Ohio.”) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance. See North &
Rutten, supra note 16, at 8. The territory was comprised of what is now considered the Midwest, north of Kentucky,
between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River.
41
See Festa, supra note 23, at 435.
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political process, and (3) reserved a public right-of-way to use navigable waters.
The Northwest Ordinance abolished primogeniture, the British system under which the firstborn son would inherit the decedents’ entire estate.42 The ordinance required that the property of
an intestate decedent “shall descent to, and be distributed among their children, and the
descendants of a deceased child, in equal parts . . . ” 43 This equality of intestate succession
contrasted with the British system, which held large property holdings intact when an intestate
property-holder died, since only one heir could take by intestate succession. The ordinance also
prohibited the use of the fee tail estate, under which land was passed down the chain of
descendants, and consequently imposed practical restrictions on inter vivos land transfers.44 The
1787 ordinance instead broke up land holdings, attacking the hereditary privilege that had inspired
considerable ire in revolutionary America.
These reforms were important for promoting republican democracy. Since voting rights were
linked to land ownership,45 only a free land-owning male could participate in political life. The
Northwest Ordinance continued the link between land ownership and political participation:
. . . no person [will] be eligible or qualified to act as a representative unless he shall
have been a citizen of one of the United States three years, and be a resident in the
district, or unless he shall have resided in the district three years; and, in either case,
shall likewise hold in his own right, in fee simple, two hundred acres of land within
the same; Provided, also, That a freehold in fifty acres of land in the district, having
been a citizen of one of the states, and being resident in the district, or the like
freehold and two years residence in the district, shall be necessary to qualify a man
as an elector of a representative.46
The Northwest Ordinance aimed to promote both settlement and political participation. To the
drafters of the ordinance, land ownership protected the security of the common man and his stake
in governance.47 They believed that land ownership was “the essential ingredient to the success of
the yeoman,”48 because non-landed suffrage was unheard of before that era. Thus, the solution to
greater political inclusiveness was to encourage widespread ownership of land and promote
security in that ownership.49
With political participation and civic virtue as functions of individual land ownership, the
Confederation Congress intended to create the security necessary to encourage settlement of the
territories.50 The 1785 ordinance therefore authorized a recording system, and the 1787 Ordinance
42

Northwest Ordinance § 2; see Festa, supra note 23, at 437.
Northwest Ordinance § 2 (emphasis added). Notably, the statute required an equal split among heirs whether male
or female (with the exception that a widow would have a third of the real estate for life). Id.
44
See Festa, supra note 23, at 438; Thomas Jefferson advocated abolishing fee tail, which he saw as part of a system
of reform “by which every fibre would be eradicated of antient [sic] or future aristocracy and a foundation laid for a
government truly republican.” Thomas Jefferson, et al., AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1743-1790, at 77
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., U. of Pa. Press, 2005) (1914). See John F. Hart, “A Less Proportion of Idle Proprietors”:
Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of Fee Tail, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 175–84 (2001) (discussing
the legislative history of abolition of fee tail in Virginia).
45
At the time of the drafting of the Northwest Ordinance and the U.S. Constitution, every state had some property or
taxpaying prerequisite to voting. See Festa, supra note 23, at 446.
46
Northwest Ordinance § 9 (emphasis added).
47
Festa, supra note 23, at 465.
48
See id. at 466.
49
See id. at 446, 465.
50
Id. at 442.
43
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created a secretarial office to maintain public land records. 51 Rampant squatting created
uncertainties and risks for settlers in the territories, and a recording system secured individual
property rights and encouraged both land alienation and development. 52 Purchasers needed a
recording system and a territorial government to keep and enforce that system in order to ensure
security in their holdings. Richard Henry Lee, Congressman from Virginia and former President
of the Continental Congress, explained the purpose of the 1787 Ordinance in these terms: “It
seemed necessary, for the security of property among uninformed, and perhaps licentious people
as the greater part of those who go there are, that a strong and toned government should exist, and
the rights of property be clearly defined.”53
The antimonopoly policy of the Northwest Ordinance was also evident in its reservation of
free travel on navigable waterways in the region. Article 4 declared:
The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the
carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and forever free, as
well to the inhabitants of the said territory as to the citizens of the United States,
and those of any other States that may be admitted into the confederacy, without
any tax, impost, or duty therefor.54
This provision was important to ensure that agricultural and other products could be freely
transported on the major highways of the era, notably the Mississippi, Ohio, and St. Lawrence
Rivers and their tributaries. Article 4’s promise of navigation access laid the foundation for the
development of the antimonopolistic public trust doctrine, 55 whose American roots lie in the
democratization of public access to waterways.56
III. LAND DISPOSITION THROUGH THE HOMESTEAD ACT
Early public land disposition focused on generating revenue to pay Revolutionary War debts,
rather than dispersing land among the broader public. Under this system, the federal government
sold one-half of the townships whole and the other half of townships in 640-acre sections.57 But
the minimum sale size and the auction price were simply unattainable for the average settler.58
Selling land in large tracts to investors and companies pursued the Hamiltonian vision of retiring
51

Ordinance of 1785, supra note 27, at 379; Northwest Ordinance § 4.
See Festa, supra note 23, at 442.
53
See GATES, supra note 6, at 72–73 (citing Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Washington (July 15, 1787)).
54
Northwest Ordinance art. IV.
55
See MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY C. WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW 48–49 (2d ed. 2015).
56
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH.
L. REV. 471, 484, 489 (1970) (finding conceptual support for the public trust doctrine in the Northwest Ordinance,
and discussing the lodestar case Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois as the most celebrated public trust
case in American law. Illinois Central upheld a state’s repeal of a large grant of land underlying Lake Michigan
because the grant would have been an abdication of the state’s trust duties to protect public access, navigation, and
commerce on navigable waters).
57
See Carstensen, supra note 24, at 34. The plan for selling tracts alternated between sales of entire townships and
sales of 640 acres parcels of the next township. Alternating the method of sale was another compromise, as putting
an entire township up for sale would necessarily mean selling to speculators. Reducing the minimum size of a
purchase was an attempt to make purchases attainable for individual buyers, as opposed to large groups of
speculators. See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 39.
58
See Roy M. Robbins, Preëmption—A Frontier Triumph, 18 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 331, 333 (1931).
52
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the war debt. The 640-acre policy was a compromise to provide opportunity to mid-sized
investors.59 Smaller investors and individuals had to purchase (at increased cost) from the initial
private purchasers.60
Over the course of the early Nineteenth century, through trial and error, Congress and the
federal Land Office developed policies in response to the numerous petitions of bona fide settlers,
who could not afford to buy land wholesale, or who were squatters.61 This proved to be a fairly
slow process, as the antimonopoly goals of public land disposition were in tension with the
motivation to repay the Revolutionary War debt and the worry that cheap land would prompt mass
emigration from the East.62 As one scholar put it, “while by law we have insisted on a recognition
of the democratic idea, in actual practice, wide departures from this ideal have not only been
tolerated, but, it would seem encouraged . . . .”63 This tension would remain a persistent theme
throughout the history of federal land disposal. In the mid-1800s, Congress enacted legislation to
address the complaints of small landowners and land seekers about the barriers imposed by
purchase requirements, minimum price per acre, and minimum sale size policies. The Jeffersonian
ideal finally triumphed in the 1862 Homestead Act, but early Nineteenth century public land
policies contained several other disposition experiments.
A.

CREDIT SALES

To facilitate settlement, Congress began to experiment with the price and parcel size issues
around the turn of the Nineteenth century. In 1796, Congress increased land sale price to $2.00 per
acre as a deterrent to speculators.64 Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin claimed that the $2.00 price
was advantageous to the population and the prosperity of the people because it “effectually
destroyed the monopoly of lands and thr[ew] the land exclusively in the hands of actual settlers. .
. .”65 In 1800, Congress reduced the minimum sale to a half-section, 320 acres, to reduce the
amount of money a settler would have to accumulate. 66 But settlers began to petition for
preemption rights—giving a squatting settler the opportunity to purchase the land on which he was
residing and cultivating, for the minimum fixed price67—thus avoiding competition at auction with
“unfeeling” land-jobbers, who, according to one contemporary account, had been “preying on the

59

See GATES, supra note 6, at 124.
See id.
61
See Robbins, supra note 58, at 333–35.
62
See id. at 335; HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 77. Mass western settlement would also provoke Indian Wars. See
Robbins, supra note 58, at 337.
63
See Robert Tudor Hill, The Public Domain and Democracy: A Study of Social, Economic and Political Problems
in the United States in Relation to Western Development, 36 STUD. IN HIST., ECON. & PUB. L. 3, 151 (1910).
64
Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, § 4, 1 Stat. 464, 467. Purchasers could pay the sale price over the course of a year.
Id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 467.
65
7 ANNALS OF CONG. 1332 (1803) (statement of Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States).
Gallatin’s claim was actually out of step with the reality of land speculation. Hundreds of residents of Ohio
complained that $2 for each acre of a 320 acre-tract was beyond the reach of the average settler, whom speculators
could outbid anyway. See GATES, supra note 6, at 131.
66
Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 55, § 4, 2 Stat. 73, 74. The Act was sponsored by William Henry Harrison, the first
delegate from the Northwest Territory. Robbins, supra note 58, at 336.
67
See Robbins, supra note 58, at 337 (describing the petitions of settlers who settled upon and improved the public
lands, seeking the right to purchase the lands they possessed at $2 per acre).
60
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Vitals of his Country. . . .”68
The 1800 Act also created an extended credit system, which Congress intended to help speed
up the process of land disposition and make it easier for a bona fide settler to purchase land.69 The
Act required purchasers to pay only a quarter of the auction price within forty days, and thereafter
make four annual installments. In 1804, Congress cut the minimum acreage in half again, down to
a quarter-section tract of 160 acres,70 retaining the credit system, and delaying interest charges
until payment was due.71
Lawmakers placed no limits on the amount of surveyed land a person or company could
purchase on credit, however, so there was no check on absentee purchasers and the purchase of
land monopolies. 72 Speculators used these low-entry costs to purchase vast tracts of land,
anticipating that the increase in value would allow them to repay the credit extended by the
government.73 Many speculators were disappointed when the values did not rise as expected.74
The credit system worked poorly for many small-holders as well. Settlers who would exhaust their
resources to make the down payment would then find it difficult to make ensuing annual payments
when the returns on their crops did not keep pace with the payment schedule. 75 Congress
responded to an outcry from western settlers by enacting several relief bills from 1806 to 1832 that
allowed delinquent purchasers extra time to pay their debts.76
B.

CASH SALES

In the wake of the Panic of 1819,77 Congress cancelled the credit system in 1820 in favor of a
cash-sale system.78 No longer could purchasers gamble by taking the chance that their agricultural
endeavors would pay the purchase price of land plus interest over a set period of time. In the cashbased system, the government required payment up front. Although settlers on the public domain
lost the benefit of a credit-installment system, the 1820 Act lowered the minimum bid price of land
to $1.25 per acre from $2 and again halved the minimum land sale from 160 acres to 80 acres,79
in order to encourage small purchases.80
68

GATES, supra note 6, at 131 (quoting an 1801 Petition of John Boggs, an Ohio resident, to Congress).
ROY M. ROBBINS, OUR LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, 1776-1936, at 18–19 (1962).
70
Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 35, § 10, 2 Stat. 277, 281.
71
Id. § 11, 2 Stat. at 281. See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 74–75; ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 25.
72
See GATES, supra note 6, at 142.
73
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 24.
74
See Tudor Hill, supra note 63, at 40.
75
See id.
76
See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 92–94; GATES, supra note 6, at 134–36 (detailing the terms of these acts from
1806 to 1816). At the time, Congress was still unwilling to provide free land grants and began to criminalize
squatting in 1807. See Robbins, supra note 58, at 338. In that year, Congress passed the Intrusion Act, which
allowed unlawful squatters to register with the local Land Office in order to become tenants-at-will, until they could
pay for their tracts. Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 46, § 2, 2 Stat. 445, 445–46. A squatter who failed to register would be
fined and jailed by the frontier army. Id. § 4, 2 Stat. at 446.
77
The Panic of 1819 was an economic depression that brought on major reductions in the price of agricultural
products, bringing ruin to land debtors. See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 97–98.
78
Act of Apr. 24, 1820, ch. 51, § 2, 3 Stat. 566, 566.
79
Compare Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 35, § 10, 2 Stat. 277, 281 (quarter sections, or 160 acres), and § 5, 2 Stat. at
279 ($2 per acre), with Act of Apr. 24, 1820, ch. 51, § 1, 3 Stat. 566, 566 (half-quarter sections, or 80 acres), and §
3, 3 Stat. at 566 ($1.25 per acre).
80
See Tudor Hill, supra note 63, at 41.
69
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The cash system did not curb land speculation, however. Banks were willing to lend to
speculators, and speculators paid the government for the land in paper bills of depreciating value.
For example, the American Land Company 81 borrowed from banks and influential investors,
bought up hundreds of thousands of acres of land without improving them, and waited to resell at
many times the price it had paid.82
Sixteen years after the adoption of the cash system, President Andrew Jackson issued his
famous “Specie Circular” to the Land Office in 1836, which directed officials to accept nothing
but hard currency for land sales.83 Jackson issued the policy in response to widespread complaints
about fraud, speculation, and monopoly of the public lands accomplished by means of the credit
banks offered after Congress had abolished the governmental credit system. The circular aimed
“to repress alleged frauds, and to withhold any countenance of facilities in the power of the
Government from the monopoly of the public lands in the hands of speculators and capitalists, to
the injury of the actual settlers in the new States . . . .” 84 Although the circular did sharply reduce
large-scale purchases, it was followed by (and perhaps induced) an economic recession that
reduced westward investment.85
Bona fide settlers were disadvantaged by the cash system. Since settlers no longer had the
benefit of an installment plan option—allowing a settler to hold occupied land until his payment
was complete—speculators could easily outbid the settler at an auction. 86 The preemption
movement, seeking to give bona fide pioneers the first right of purchase, gained steam due to the
inequities of the cash system.
C.

PREEMPTION SALES AND GRADUATED PRICING

In 1830, Congress passed a preemption act, which retroactively gave settlers in possession
of and cultivating land in 1829 the option of guaranteed purchase. The Act allowed settlers to
purchase up to 160 acres for $1.25 per acre within one year, without an auction.87 In principle,
preemption aimed to put occupants on the same playing field as absentees, giving small
landholders an opportunity to purchase small parcels of land at the minimum price without being
outbid. The Act pardoned illegal settlers who had already been working the land. 88 Congress also
passed preemption statutes in 1838 and 1840, in order to extend the benefits and privileges of the
1830 Act to those who settled on the public lands after the 1830 Act went into effect.89 To claim
preemption, a settler had to be at least twenty-one years old, the head of a household, and an actual
resident on the land,90 conditions that aimed to prevent speculators and others from claiming more
than their fair share without going through the auction process.91
81

Investors and officers of which included members of Congress. See GATES, supra note 6, at 171–74.
See id. at 171–73. Where the company had purchased land at $1.25 an acre, in 1836 it advertised the same land
from $7 to $15 per acre. Id. at 173.
83
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 70.
84
GATES, supra note 6, at 175.
85
See GATES, supra note 6, at 175–76; Robbins, supra note 58, at 344.
86
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 50.
87
Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 208, § 1, 4 Stat. 420, 420–21; GATES, supra note 6, at 225.
88
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 342.
89
Act of June 22, 1838, ch. 119, 5 Stat. 251, 251; Act of June 1, 1840, ch. 32, § 5, 5 Stat. 382, 382.
90
Act of June 22, 1838, 5 Stat. at 251; see ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 76.
91
Each claimant took an oath that he entered on the land “in his own right, and exclusively for his own use and
benefit,” and that he had not “directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in any way or any manner, with
82
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Congress passed a major expansion of preemption in 1841.92 The General Preemption Act of
1841, for the first time, prospectively recognized the right of a settler to reside on land prior to
purchase and to purchase that land without competition.93 The statute embodied several ideas that
Congress would incorporate into the Homestead Act two decades later, including: (1) the notion
that promoting settlement was more important than generating revenue;94 (2) the sentiment that
the public domain should be split up into many small farms, rather than concentrated in the hands
of large landowners;95 and (3) the belief that bona fide settlers should be protected while in the
process of earning enough money to fulfill the purchase price.96 The 1841 statute marked the end
of the conservative land-disposal policy that favored revenue production over egalitarian
distribution.97
Another step toward preventing land monopolies was the Graduation Act of 1854.98 Since the
government imposed a uniform minimum price of $1.25 per acre, regardless of land quality, whole
portions of townships—composed of less valuable land—went unsold for decades. As indicated
previously, the survey-and-sale system was indiscriminate as to landforms, features, or arability.99
The result was that some sections of land were leapfrogged and left unpurchased. Consequently,
in 1854, Congress reduced the minimum price of these leftover tracts, not by individual appraisal,
but by how long they remained unsold.100 For a tract unsold for ten to fifteen years, a buyer would
pay $1 per acre, down from $1.25. For a parcel unsold for fifteen to twenty years, the price was
$0.75 per acre. Lands unsold for thirty or more years were available for just twelve-and-a-half
cents, so-called one-bit land.101 Graduated prices made land more accessible to settlers of lesser
means.102 The law required an affidavit that the purchaser would occupy and cultivate the land (or
use the land in support of an adjoining farm owned or occupied by him), would devote the land to
personal use, and would acquire no more than 320-acres under the Act.103
The 1854 Graduation Act was limited in terms of its democratizing effect on public land

any person or persons whatever, by which the title which he might acquire from the Government of the United
States should inure to the use or benefit of anyone except himself, or to convey or transfer the said land, or the title
which he may acquire to the same, to any other person or persons whatever, at any subsequent time . . . .” Act of
June 22, 1838, 5 Stat. at 251.
92
General Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453, repealed by General Revision Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 4, 26
Stat. 1095, 1097.
93
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 89. Settlement prior to payment no longer constituted trespass. See id.
94
See id. at 91.
95
Importantly, in terms of antimonopoly policy, the Act required a purchaser to erect a dwelling on the land,
required that a settler must not be a proprietor of 320 or more acres in any territory, and limited entry under the law
to 160 acres. General Preemption Act of 1841, § 10, 5 Stat. at 455–56.
96
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 91.
97
See id.
98
Graduation Act of 1854, ch. 244, 10 Stat. 574 (note the title to the Act: “[t]o Graduate and Reduce the Price of the
Public Lands to actual Settlers and Cultivators.”)
99
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
100
Graduation Act of 1854, § 1, 10 Stat. at 574.
101
Id. The 1854 statute excluded mineral lands, which the government sold for $1.25 per acre. Id.
102
Senator Benton from Missouri had even advocated a graduation system that would provide some free land “to
such poor persons as may be willing to take and cultivate them,” quoted in HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 290–91.
103
Graduation Act of 1854, § 3, 10 Stat. at 574.
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sales,104 since it did not require proof of settlement, and it was not restricted to landless people.105
Although the Land Office’s policy required witness of the occupant’s actual occupation of the
land, this requirement was easily gamed. 106 Moreover, the leftover land was marginal and
sometimes of poor quality for agriculture, the mainstay of the small settler.107 On the other hand,
the Act did provide a new opportunity for investors with little cash flow, 108 and the 320-acre
limitation reiterated a growing sentiment that public lands should not be available in large tracts
to monopolists for speculation.109 Later, in the 1860s and 1870s, disposition acts would carry on
the tradition of an acreage limitation—for example, in the Homestead, Timber and Stone, and
Desert Land Acts.110
D.

THE HOMESTEAD ACT

As early as 1828, the House Public Lands Committee recommended homesteading legislation
to accommodate the growing numbers of settlers seeking small tracts at a fair price. 111 The
committee asked the House to take notice of:
[T]he fact that there are many families who are neither void of industry nor of good
moral habits, who have met with the usual share of the difficulties always
accompanying the settlement of a new country, and who, living very remote from
the market, never expect to see the day arrive when they will be enabled to save
enough, with all their efforts, from their means of support, to purchase a farm and
pay for it in cash.112
Some states like Missouri and Illinois prodded Congress for land cessions, so they could donate
land to indigent settlers.113 Missouri’s petition to Congress claimed that “the passage of such a law
would . . . not only promote the strength and prosperity of this frontier state, but the happiness of
thousands who, from the want of pecuniary means, are compelled to remain in an anti-republican
state of dependence on rich landlords.”114 But it would not be until three decades later, during the
104

The main purpose of graduation was not to get cheap lands into the hands of poor farmers, but to earn revenue on
lands that had been overlooked. See GATES, supra note 6, at 185 (suggesting that without a means of enforcing the
320-acre limitation, the 1854 statute represented mere window dressing, not a serious attempt at egalitarian
distribution and antimonopoly).
105
See GATES, supra note 6, at 187.
106
See id. at 190.
107
See id. at 182 (describing leftover Graduation Act acreage as “sometimes fractional quarters, hilly, broken, cut by
ravines or streams, swampy or low land unpromising for crops. . . . If the broken land was suitable for pasture or had
good grass for hay, nearby owners saw little reason to buy it and pay taxes on it as long as they could graze their
livestock on it . . . . Everywhere in the West the process of land selection had left behind these neglected tracts,
stripped of their timber, overgrazed . . . .”).
108
Paul Gates maintained that the proponents’ real purpose was not to help the “small man” but to reduce the sale
price and encourage cession of these lands to the states (citing the fact that large amounts of unsold tracts of usable
land remained in the southern states). See id. at 184.
109
See id. at 187. The homestead advocate, Horace Greeley, supported the acreage limitation, but lamented that it
was unenforced, so that “any shrewd monopolist can drive a coach and six through it.” Id.
110
Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392, 392; Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377;
Timber and Stone Act of 1878, ch. 151, § 1, 20 Stat. 89, 89.
111
See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 351.
112
See id.
113
See id. at 350–51.
114
See id.
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Civil War (with the South out of the Union and out of the Senate),115 that Congress would provide
free land for settlement. Southern politicians opposed granting free land to small holders because
they worried that homestead legislation would fill the West with Yankee settlers opposed to
slavery.116
As enacted in 1862, the Homestead Act entitled any person twenty-one years or older to claim
up to 160 acres of public land without fee.117 At long last, the Lockean vision of free land for labor
was government policy.118 The Act required the homesteader to ‘prove up’ his site after five years
and pay only a registration fee and small commission to the register or receiver of the Land Office
to obtain a land patent.119 The Act included limitations designed to ensure that only bona fide
settlers obtained free land, requiring the settler to swear that he (1) would use the land for actual
settlement and cultivation, (2) was not acquiring the land on behalf of someone else, and (3) was
the head of the household or twenty-one years of age.120 In the Homestead Act, Congress sought
to rectify many of the elements which had worked against bona fide settlement in the past—land
price, purchase medium, minimum acreage, and time allowed for payment of debt. The land was
now essentially free; the purchase medium became five years of sweat equity, rather than cash or
credit; the acreage was limited to 160 acres121 in order to give all a fair chance. These changes
reflected the overriding purpose of providing homes and a means of livelihood to the average
farmer, achieving the vision of the 1828 Public Lands Committee, which advocated homesteading:
. . . [Y]our committee believes that such small earnings [of the poor] applied to the
improvement and cultivation of small tracts, scattered through the public domain,
would be as advantageous to the public as though they should be paid directly to
the treasury. No axiom in political economy is sounder then the one which declares
that the wealth and strength of the country, and more especially, of the republic,
consists not so much in the number of its citizens as in their employments, their
capability of bearing arms, and of sustaining the burdens of taxation whenever the
public exigencies shall require it.”122
The Homestead Act represented the triumph of Jeffersonian land disposition, favoring free land
for bona fide settlers over the Hamiltonian method of disposition to speculators and middle-men
that had dominated the early era.123
Although the Homestead Act made land acquisition accessible to the small farmer, it was
actually no panacea for the yeoman. Importantly, the cash sale statute of 1820 was still on the
115

See id. at 366–67, 383–85; ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 206.
See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 193 (1988).
117
Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392, 392. A homesteader could claim, for free, 160 acres that the
government had offered at $1.25 an acre, or up to eighty acres of land the government offered for sale at $2.50 an
acre. Id.
118
Id. The concept of a homestead evokes a Lockean view of property, in that a person can lawfully privatize that
amount of resources (or acorns, in the Lockean allegory) that he can put to use by his labors. LOCKE, supra note 1, §
31.
119
That is, the settler had to show, before receiving title from the government, that he lived on or cultivated the
homestead for five years. Id. § 2, 12 Stat. at 392; see GATES, supra note 6, at 394–95.
120
Homestead Act § 2, 12 Stat. at 392.
121
Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 392.
122
See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 351.
123
See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
116
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books, and no acreage limitation attached to such sales. A land speculator could still anticipate
settlement by buying land in unlimited amounts. 124 Homesteading was not permitted on
unsurveyed lands (although squatting surely did occur) until 1880. 125 With cash sales still
available, buyers were able to pay the speculator’s price for lands closer to existing towns.126
Additionally, millions of acres of land were off-limits to homesteading by virtue of the fact that
175 million acres were Indian land,127 140 million acres were conveyed by the federal government
to new states as part of statehood, and 125 million acres were the subject of federal railroad
grants.128
E.

RAILROAD GRANTS AND RISING ANTIMONOPOLY SENTIMENT

The second half of the Nineteenth century saw the rise of antimonopoly as a political
movement pressing for land reforms, particularly in instituting resale conditions in railroad
grants.129 Settlers in the West developed great antipathy towards railroad companies, to which
Congress granted millions of acres of land in exchange for the service of building major transit
infrastructure across the nation. Congress intended the companies to sell the land to pay for
construction, but the companies retained vast acreages of formerly public lands for decades,
engaging in their own form of land speculation. 130 According to one account, the railroads
influenced the settlement of one-third of the country.131
124

See GATES, supra note 6, at 435.
Act of May 14, 1880, ch. 89, 21 Stat. 140, 140–41.
126
See GATES, supra note 6, at 397. Also, the practice of commuting homesteaded land undermined the effort to
ensure that the lands stayed in the hands of small owners, as the statute allowed individuals to buy the lands after six
months instead of occupying and working the land for five years. These “commuted homesteads” often fell into the
hands of timber companies. See Gary D. Libecap & Ronald N. Johnson, Property Rights, Nineteenth-Century
Federal Timber Policy, and the Conservation Movement, 39 J. ECON. HIST. 129, 131 (1979).
127
The model of the homestead—which represented a triumph of distributive justice for settlers—proved disastrous
when applied a quarter-century later to Native Americans. In 1887, Congress imposed the 160-acre settlement
system on Indian tribes in the West. Dawes Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388, 388. The Dawes Act initiated the
transformation of communally-held tribal land into 160-acre allotments for individual Indians, leading to the
dissolution of many tribal communal cultures. See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 283. The statute offered citizenship to
tribal members who chose a “civilized life” by settling onto homestead allotments. § 6, 24 Stat. at 390. After carving
up the communal Indian reservations into individual homestead tracts and allocating those tracts to the individual
tribal members, the Dawes Act authorized the federal government to sell the remaining “surplus” reservation lands
to white homesteaders in 160-acre parcels. § 5, 24 Stat. at 389–90. By 1906, three-fifths of Indian lands had been
appropriated by white settlement. See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 284.
128
See GATES, supra note 6, at 397.
129
See id. at 454; GEORGE DRAFFAN, TAKING BACK OUR LAND, A HISTORY OF RAILROAD LAND GRANT REFORM 10
(1998); see also Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492 (the “Union Pacific Act” required the railroad to
relinquish its hold on land grants it had not used in a timely manner, so that the public could make use of the land at
an affordable price: “[L]ands so granted by this section which shall not be sold or disposed of by said company
within three years after the entire road shall have been completed, shall be subject to settlement and pre-emption like
other lands, at a price not exceeding $1.25 per acre to be paid to said company.”).
130
See Tudor Hill, supra note 63, at 199.
131
See DRAFFAN, supra note 129, at 6 (citing Fred Shannon, The Railroad Land Grant Legend in American History
Texts, 32 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 572–74 (1946)). Although railroad grants covered fully ten percent of the
country, these grants were composed of opposite sections of land in a checkerboard pattern, increasing the influence
of the railroads over miles of land. The monopoly railroads created was not limited to land; on the frontier the
companies monopolized grain terminals, set transportation rates at “whatever the traffic could bear,” controlled
125

16

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662313

From the 1850s to 1871, Congress (along with individual states) pursued a policy of granting
millions of acres of public lands to the railroads. Once it became apparent that the railroad
companies were selling the lands in large tracts to other companies or holding onto the better part
of their grants, a land reform bloc in Congress began to advocate for inclusion of homestead
provisions in the grants, to prevent monopoly and ensure distribution to actual settlers and
farmers.132
Congress began to include such conditions in railroad grants after 1866.133 For example, the
1869 grant to the Oregon and California (“O&C”) Railroad included a proviso that the granted
land “shall be sold to actual settlers only, in quantities not greater than one-quarter section [160
acres] to one purchaser, and for a price not exceeding two dollars and fifty cents per acre.”134 Not
only did the legislation seek to break the monopoly by forcing sale to the public, it required sales
to small landowners at specified prices. However, what was intended to be a redistributive policy
ultimately failed, because the General Land Office, which suffered from a lack of funding and
purportedly operated under the influence of the railroads, rarely enforced it.135 By 1870, the House
of Representatives resolved to issue no more railroad grants,136 deciding that the public lands
should instead “be held for the exclusive purpose of securing homesteads to the actual settlers
under the homestead and preemption laws . . . .”137
In the 1870s, Congress began to institute a series of forfeiture laws to re-vest hundreds of
thousands of acres of railway grants into the public domain and reopen the land to settlement. 138
The forfeiture movement that provoked this change in policy was fueled by the fact that many
railroad grantees had not finished their lines. Because they had not yet fulfilled the conditions of
mortgages and other loans, and often inspected farmers’ books to monitor their profits. See DRAFFAN, supra note
121, at 6–7.
132
Under the preexisting policy, “the railroad corporations have been able to withdraw vast tracts of land from the
market and hold them for an unlimited time out of the reach of persons desiring to purchase for actual settlement,
thereby retarding the settlement of the country, and doing manifest injustice to those seeking homes for cultivation
by creating vast monopolies.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4428 (1866) (statement of Rep. Benjamin
Hopkins of Wisconsin).
133
See DRAFFAN, supra note 129, at 10.
134
Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 27, 16 Stat. 47, amending Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, 24 Stat. 239. However, instead
of selling its land grants only to settlers in limited parcels, the O&C Railroad sold large amounts of timbered acreage
at market prices. In the 1890s, when the timber industry began to grow in the Northwest, O&C patented 2,450,000
acres of its grant, and sold the parcels greater than 160 acres and for prices between $5 and $40 per acre, in violation
of the settler provision of its grant. See United States v. Or. & Cal. R.R., 186 F. 861, 873 (D. Or. 1911). See
DRAFFAN, supra note 129, at 22. Faced with antimonopoly protest from Oregonians, Congress called on the U.S.
Attorney General to enforce O&C grant limitations. S.J. Res. 18, 60th Cong., 35 Stat. 571 (1908). See generally
Michael C. Blumm & Tim Wigington, The Oregon & California Railroad Grant Lands’ Sordid Past, Contentious
Present, and Uncertain Future: A Century of Conflict, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. REV. 1 (2013) (providing a
history of the controversy surrounding the so-called O&C Lands).
135
See DRAFFAN, supra note 129, at 10; David Maldwin Ellis, The Forfeiture of Railroad Land Grants, 1867-1894,
33 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 27, 31 n.9, 33 (1946).
136
Although in the next term the House approved further grants, the railroad land grant policy came to an end in
1871. See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 277.
137
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 2 Sess. 2095 (1870). Farm groups, labor organizations, land reformers, and politicians
pressured Congress to make this change. Ellis, supra note 135, at 38.
138
See, e.g., Act of July 11, 1870, ch. 241, 16 Stat. 227 (New Orleans, Opelousas & Great Western); Act of Apr. 15,
1874, ch. 97, 18 Stat. 29 (Placerville & Sacramento Valley); Act of June 16, 1874, ch. 285, 18 Stat. 72 (Stockton
and Copperopolis Railroad); Act of July 24, 1876, ch. 227, 19 Stat. 101 (Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston); Act
of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 125, 19 Stat. 404 (Kansas & Neosho Valley Railroad).
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the grants, these railroad grantees were withholding millions of acres from settlement. 139 The
1880s brought further forfeiture legislation as antimonopoly sentiment grew, supported by agrarian
parties that would later form the Populist Party.140 From 1884 to 1887 Congress passed bills to revest more than twenty-eight million acres, 141 then a general forfeiture law in 1890, 142 which
declared the forfeiture of all grants that were unearned at the time of the Act’s passage.143 The
statute effectuated the forfeiture of only 5.6 million acres144—several times less than the demands
of Democrats. Ultimately, this era of reform energized agrarians and other antimonopolists, whose
fervor would spark a new era of resource management in the Twentieth century, as discussed below
in Part IV.
IV. NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
For most of the Nineteenth century, federal natural resource management policies in the West
were virtually non-existent. The government’s chief policy was to dispose of the vast expanse of
the continent to American settlers. Not until 1831 did Congress legislate to manage publicly owned
timber.145 Over the course of the Nineteenth century, Congress began to enact resource-related
laws with acreage limits and imposed diligent pursuit requirements 146 and public access
provisions—all classic antimonopoly safeguards against speculation and resource concentration.
However, loopholes and weak enforcement thwarted much of these limitations’ antimonopoly
potential. On the other hand, Congress experimented with resource leasing—which allowed the
public to share in the rent and royalties from the sale of public resources—147 and would later
authorize federal land planning based on resource suitability. Congress also protected access to the
resources on public lands through the 1885 Unlawful Inclosures Act.148 Safeguarding public access
was another core element of antimonopoly policy.149
A.

ANTIMONOPOLY IN EARLY TIMBER MANAGEMENT

Public timber resources went largely unmanaged throughout most of the Nineteenth century.

139

See DRAFFAN, supra note 129, at 10.
See Ellis, supra note 135, at 40.
141
Act of June 28, 1884, ch. 131, 23 Stat. 61; Act of Jan. 31, 1885, ch. 46, 23 Stat. 296; Act of Feb. 28, 1885, ch.
265, 23 Stat. 337; Act of July 6, 1886, ch. 637, 24 Stat. 123. See Ellis, supra note 135, at 42 (calculating that these
four statutes re-vested 601,000, 810,880, 15,692,800, and 10,795,40 acres, respectively).
142
Act of Sep. 29, 1890, ch. 1040, 26 Stat. 496.
143
Id.
144
See Ellis, supra note 135, at 55.
145
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 66, 4 Stat. 472. (outlining punishments for offenses related to destroying or removing
timber reserved for naval purposes).
146
See infra notes 150, 159–171, 184–191, 217–24 and accompanying text (describing the antimonopoly elements
of the Timber Cutting Act, Timber and Stone Act, the General Mining Law, and Unlawful Inclosures Act).
147
See infra notes 166–71 and accompanying text.
148
Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1061). See infra notes 209–10.
149
See, e.g., Sax, supra note 56, at 484–85 (explaining that the conceptual foundations of the antimonopolistic
public trust doctrine arose from ideas expressed in the free public navigation provision of the Northwest Ordinance,
early New England laws preserving for free public use the “great ponds,” and the setting-aside of national parks for
public use).
140
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For example, although an 1831 statute made it illegal to cut timber from the public lands,150 the
public largely ignored the law. Settlers, railroad companies, and mill owners alike stole timber
from government land, and the law essentially went unenforced.151 The reality on the frontier was
that settlers considered unfenced forests to be common resources. 152 Commercial enterprises
cleared government-owned acreage to feed growing cities and power steamboats.153
During the second half of the Nineteenth century, Congress and the Department of the Interior
began instituting policies to prevent monopolistic use of forest land, while recognizing the claims
of small landowners. At mid-century, the agency154 began to enforce rules against timber trespass,
using timber agents to gather evidence and prosecute offenders. Some state representatives decried
the action as unfair to small homesteaders and frontiersmen, claiming that otherwise “law abiding”
citizens had no choice but to steal.155 In the early 1850s, Interior clarified its antimonopoly policy
by disclaiming any intent to interfere with bona fide settlers taking a reasonable amount of wood
for building homes, bridges, and fences. Instead, the main government target was “speculators
whose sole object and pursuit are the manufacture and exportation of lumber, for their own profit,
without compensation to the government or benefit to the country whence it is taken.”156 Over the
subsequent decades, railroads and sawmill operators tried to convince Congress that government
timber agents were wresting firewood and building materials from the hands of average settlers
and should be stopped.157 In reality, the agents were preoccupied with large-scale timber removals
by corporations such as the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, the Colorado Central Railroad,
and the Boston & Colorado Smelting Company, which the United States sued for tens of thousands
of dollars in stolen timber.158
A large part of the timberlands had never been offered for sale, and there was still no good way
for the average settler to legally obtain timber from those lands until the late 1870s. In 1878,
Congress enacted both the Timber and Stone Act and the Timber Cutting Act to make timber
Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 66, § 1, 4 Stat. 472, 472 (if a person should remove any “timber, from any other lands
[other than those set aside to provide timber for the Navy] of the United States, acquired, or hereafter to be acquired,
with intent to export, dispose of use, or employ the same in any manner whatsoever, other than for the navy of the
United States” shall be fined and imprisoned).
151
See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 121 (1993).
152
Most frontiersmen took the timber they found on unenclosed lands regardless of land ownership. See GATES,
supra note 6, at 534. To the pioneers, the standing forest on the frontier served little value; it was an impediment to
agriculture and improvements, provided useful building material for settlement, but was valuable only insofar as it
could be cut and converted to shelter. See id. For a typical Nineteenth century judicial view of the unenclosed forest
land as a commons, see McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. 244, 351 (S.C. Const. App. 1818) (upholding the public’s
right to hunt on privately owned, unenclosed rural forestland).
153
See GATES, supra note 6, at 534–35 (describing the small commercial lumbering that served steamboat and
railroads construction and urban development).
154
Congress founded the Department of the Interior in 1849. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108 § 1, 9 Stat. 395, 395.
155
For example, the Minnesota territorial legislature issued a statement reflecting its frustration with the fact that the
federal government had yet to offer pine land at public sale, or open these lands to preemption sales. Nevertheless,
hundreds of Minnesotans engaged in lumbering as an occupation. The territorial legislature argued against
prosecuting those individuals for trespass, claiming the prosecutions would “fill[] the pockets of a few government
officials at the expense of the law abiding community[.]” See GATES, supra note 6, at 538 (quoting a Memorial
signed by Alexander Ramsey, Territorial Governor (Feb. 14, 1852)).
156
See GATES, supra note 6, at 539 (quoting Sec’y Interior McClelland’s Letter of May 14, 1852).
157
See GATES, supra note 6, at 549, 554.
158
See 7 CONG. REC. H1533 (Mar. 6, 1878) (statement of Rep. Charles Foster of Ohio, defending the legitimacy of
these suits and asking for $20,000 in appropriations so that the Secretary of the Interior could continue to investigate
and prosecute them).
150
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available to settlers and miners.159 Both statutes reflected antimonopoly sentiments.160
The Timber Cutting Act allowed citizens of specified states and territories to cut timber without
charge from “mineral lands” for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes.161
Although Congress limited timber cutting to domestic, agricultural, or mining purposes in order to
support the individual miner and settler, expressly excluding railroad companies, 162 the
government failed to enforce the Act to prevent large companies from benefitting from it. 163
Indeed, the General Land Office expressed concern in an 1882 report that, “[d]epredations upon
the public timber by powerful corporations, wealthy mill owners, lumber companies and
unscrupulous monopolists . . . are still being committed to an alarming extent and great public
detriment.”164 The law was largely unenforced against unauthorized commercial extraction.165
The Timber and Stone Act, which Congress enacted on the same day in 1878, complemented
the Timber Cutting Act and reflected the same antimonopoly sentiment. The statute authorized the
government to offer public land unfit for cultivation but chiefly valuable for timber or stone for
sale at a $2.50 per acre minimum.166 The Act restricted each sale to 160 acres and required the
purchaser to file an affidavit that the timber and stone was for personal use, not for speculation or
on behalf of any other person. 167 Congress intended this statute to operate similarly to
homesteading legislation, in which small resource users could privatize only enough forested land
for personal benefit.168 Nevertheless, large companies often purchased timber and stone acreage
by fraud or secondary purchase, amassing large land holdings.169 The Act also declared that timber
removal from public lands was illegal, but the law made clear that miners and farmers would not
be prosecuted if they cut timber in the course of clearing their farm for tillage or for taking the
amount of timber necessary to support improvements on the land.170 Decades later, in 1909, the
159

Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 150, 20 Stat. 88 (Timber Cutting Act); Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89 (Timber
and Stone Act).
160
Paul Gates claimed that the Timber and Stone Act aimed less to benefit the settler, and more to open up unoffered
timberlands to western timber companies. GATES, supra note 6, at 550–51. However, the Senate voted against
offering the land at auction in unlimited amounts. See id. at 551.
161
Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 150, § 1, 20 Stat. 88, (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 604 (1921)) (granting residents
of Colorado, Nevada, and the Territories of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Dakota, Idaho, and Montana
“and all other mineral districts of the United States” the right to cut timber for mining, domestic, and agricultural
purposes). But see HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 463–64 (noting that because many mineral lands were unknown, or
vastly interspersed, unpermitted timber cutting on non-mineral lands continued).
162
Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 150, § 1, 20 Stat. at 88.
163
See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 464.
164
GENERAL LAND OFFICE REPORT OF 1882, quoted in HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 464.
165
See GATES, supra note 6, at 552 n.60 (“the registers had shown a marked tendency to tolerate or perhaps one
should say wink at infractions of the law by the larger economic interests . . . .”).
166
Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 151, § 1, 20 Stat. 89, 89 (applying to surveyed lands within California, Oregon, Nevada,
and the Washington Territory).
167
Id. § 2.
168
See Gary Libecap & Ronald Johnson, Property Rights, Nineteenth-Century Federal Timber Policy, and the
Conservation Movement, 39 J. ECON. HIST. 129, 129–32 (1979) (comparing the Homestead Act’s acreage limits and
bona-fide settlement requirement to the requirements of the Timber and Stone Act, arguing that timber companies
lacked sufficient lawful opportunities to acquire profitable amounts of timber acreage, so they ignored the law).
169
HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 466 (noting that one company acquired over 100,000 acres of the most valuable
redwood lands in California).
170
Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 151, § 4, 20 Stat. 90 (“. . . it shall be illegal to cut . . . any timber growing on any lands of
the United States, in said States and Territory [California, Oregon, Nevada, and in the Washington Territory] . . .
with intent to export or dispose of the same . . . and any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty
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National Conservation Commission would urge repeal of the Act, partly because its
antimonopolistic policies were ignored in practice, and partly because of the vast disparity between
the value of the land and the meager compensation the government obtained from sales.171
B.

ANTIMONOPOLY IN EARLY MINING LAW

The federal government experimented with different approaches to mineral disposition
throughout the Nineteenth century until 1872. Several early federal mining policies contained
antimonopoly elements, such as authorizing disposition by lease (rather than sale), acreage
limitations, investment requirements, and location prerequisites.
Before the Civil War, the federal government’s mineral policy was minimal. The land
disposition statutes reserved mineral lands to the federal government. Since mineral lands were
hard to identify, however, homesteaders or purchasers patented a considerable amount of land
containing minerals.172 In 1807, the government experimented with a leasing policy for lead mines
in the Indiana Territory. 173 Although Congress terminated the leasing program in 1846 as an
economic failure, 174 the leasing system enabled the government to encourage resource
development while retaining public title to the land and obtaining a fair economic return for the
public.
The Supreme Court upheld the 1807 leasing policy some three decades later in United States
v. Gratiot,175 a case in which the federal government sought to recover unpaid royalties from a
lessee. The miner claimed that the government could not retain ownership of the leased land under
the Property Clause,176 but the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had wide discretion as to how
to dispose of the public lands because “this power is vested in Congress without limitation.”177
Gratiot was the first of a long line of decisions in which the Court upheld broad federal power to
establish the conditions under which private parties may obtain private interests in public
resources.178
But Congress abandoned the leasing idea in 1846, liberalizing disposition by offering mineral
lands for sale in unlimited amounts. 179 In the West, the gold rush frenzy brought on by the
of a misdemeanor . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat nothing herein contained shall prevent any miner or agriculturalist from
clearing his land in the ordinary working of his mining claim, or preparing his farm for tillage, or from taking the
timber necessary to support his improvements, or the taking of timber for the use of the United States . . . .).
171
See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 467-69 (citing REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, S. DOC.
NO. 60-676, at 71 (1909)) (explaining that the federal government was losing $25 million annually of the actual
value of timber that purchasers acquired under the Act).
172
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 151.
173
Act of March 3, 1807, ch. 49, § 5, 2 Stat. 448, 449 (enacting a leasing system limited to terms of five years).
174
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 151 (explaining that many ignored the leasing requirement, and that the
administrative costs of the leasing program exceeded the royalties it produced).
175
United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 538 (1840).
176
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2: “Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property, belonging to the United States.”
177
39 U.S. at 537.
178
See, e.g., Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (“The United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the
terms on which its property may be used.”); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 523 (1911) (requirement of a
permit to graze a forest reservation constitutional).
179
See Act of July 11, 1846, ch. 36, 9 Stat. 37 (Illinois and Wisconsin); Act of March 1, 1847, ch. 32, 9 Stat. 146
(northern Michigan); Act of March 3, 1847, ch. 54, 9 Stat. 179 (northern Wisconsin); see ROBBINS, supra note 69, at
151.
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discoveries in northern California prevented the federal government from establishing a workable
sales system. 180 Congress did not address public lands mining again until after the Civil War,
declaring in the 1866 Mining Act that both surveyed and unsurveyed mineral lands would be free
and open to exploration for lode mining181 and occupation.182 In 1870, Congress offered placer
mine lands for sale at $2.50 an acre.183 In 1872, it incorporated both placer and lode mining into
the 1872 General Mining Law, which offered mineral deposits for free and lode claim patents at
$5 per acre.184 The 1872 law established a capture system for hard rock minerals that persists to
this day.185
Three major factors of the 1872 law’s mining paradigm reflected antimonopoly
characteristics. First, Congress imposed limits on the size of claims 186 Second, the 1872 law
required an annual monetary investment,187 aimed at deterring individuals and companies from
excluding others by claiming many alleged “discoveries.”188 Third, the text of the statute forbade
a miner from locating a claim until discovery of a valuable mineral. 189 The latter provision was
designed to prevent a speculator from staking many parcels and excluding other prospectors. All
of these limits reflected an intent to democratize access to the resource and promote diligent pursuit
of small claims by individual prospectors.190 However, as Gordon Bakken has noted, today the Act
mainly benefits large corporations.191
C.

THE ANTIMONOPOLY BATTLE OVER RANGELANDS

180

See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 220 (explaining that the miners established associations and self-regulated their
claims, making their own laws for mining districts).
181
Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 3, 14 Stat. 251, 252 (limiting plats and surveys to one vein or lode each).
182
Id. § 1, 14 Stat. at 251.
183
Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 12, 16 Stat. 217, 217. Placer mining takes advantage of minerals that have been
deposited by the action of rivers and streams. See GEORGE COGGINS & ROBERT GLICKSMAN, 4 PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 42:12 (West 2015).
184
General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, § 6, 17 Stat. 91, 93 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 29).
185
GORDON M. BAKKEN, THE MINING LAW OF 1872: PAST, POLITICS, AND PROSPECTS 7 (2008).
186
Lode claims may be no longer than 1,500 feet. General Mining Act of 1872, § 2, 17 Stat. at 91 (codified at 30
U.S.C. § 23). By using a tunnel, a miner could claim minerals within 3,000 feet of the face of the tunnel. General
Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, § 4, 17 Stat. 91, 92 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 27). Placer claims are limited to twenty
acres per individual, General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, § 10, 17 Stat. 91, 94 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 35), or up to
160 acres by an association. Act of July 9, 1870, § 12, 16 Stat. at 217 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 36); see WILKINSON,
supra note 151, at 20, 45.
187
General Mining Act of 1872, § 5, 17 Stat. at 92 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 28). Notably, the provision required
“assessment work” of “not less than $100 of labor” per claim, or the miner would forfeit the claim. Id.
188
See BAKKEN, supra note 185, at 34.
189
General Mining Act of 1872, § 2, 17 Stat. at 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 23). But the Supreme Court discounted
the requirement of discovery before location in Union Oil v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 (1918). Until discovery, the local
doctrine of pedis possessio protected miners so long as the miner diligently pursued discovery and maintained a
presence on the land, a common law protection against claim-jumping. See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183,
§ 42:9.
190
See BAKKEN, supra note 185, at 6 (stating that “The Mining Law of 1872 was written to deal primarily with local
issues such as claims, but the statute had wide-ranging implications for the nation. Its authors saw lone prospectors
much like yeoman farmers moving westward to scratch out a living and individually create the wealth of the
nation.”).
191
Id. at 7.
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Although Congress created a number of enforceable rights for miners, 192 it never created
similar property rights for ranchers. Throughout the Nineteenth century, the federal government
instead instituted a policy maintaining open access to grasslands for everyone, culminating in an
anti-fencing measure enacted in 1885.193 While monopolistic ventures were attempting to privatize
the open range, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s authority to decide that the public range not
fall into de facto possession by the few.194
The federal government did not establish an allocation system for the range resource until well
into the Twentieth century. The 1862 Homestead Act opened rangelands to settlement, 195 but
ranchers often needed more forage than a 160-acre homestead could provide. 196 To secure a
workable amount of land for barns, corrals, and pastures, ranchers acquired adjacent homesteads
from family members 197 and required their cowboys to make entries under Timber Culture,
Homestead, and Desert Land Acts,198 thereby undermining the antimonopolistic goals of those
statutes. Many entries under the Desert Land Act were not actually desert lands. According to Roy
Robbins, the statute did more to encourage western ranching than to facilitate reclamation of the
arid lands.199 Outside their base holdings, ranchers made use of the great biomass growing on the
unreserved public domain for their livestock. 200 The federal government simply allowed the
cattlemen to graze their herds freely, thus frustrating federal land allocation strategy.201
On the public domain, a first-come, first-served attitude prevailed among cattlemen. With no
secure way of maintaining their customary cattle range, ranchers would post notices in local papers
warning others not to graze on the acreage they claimed.202 The ranchers’ competition for the range
resource came both from homesteaders and nomadic sheepherders. The yeoman farmer, who could
obtain legal title to the land, threatened the free rein of the rancher, who could not.203 Sheepherders
roamed the public lands in search of forage. And since the public range was interspersed with
private lands, this “checkerboard” ownership pattern created access issues for both cattle and sheep
graziers. Access across private holdings produced numerous conflicts in the Nineteenth and early
Twentieth Centuries.
Charles Wilkinson referred to the General Mining Law of 1872 as a “miner’s Magna Carta.” WILKINSON, supra
note 151, at 44.
193
Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1061).
194
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) (upholding congressional authority to restrict the fencing of
private lands that had the effect of enclosing public lands).
195
Some portions of public grasslands were unfit for cultivation. Nevertheless, the Homestead Act allowed settlers
to perfect their claims by showing proof of residence or cultivation after five years. Section 2 of the Act required a
settler to “prove by two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for the term
of five years.” Homestead Act, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. at 392.
196
See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 83.
197
See id.
198
ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 250. The Desert Land Act allowed an individual to enter 640 acres of land if he could
irrigate the land—a requirement considerably more burdensome than the Homestead Act’s conditions of residing
upon or cultivating the acreage. Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377.
199
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 250.
200
See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 83. Violence between ranchers and homesteaders was not uncommon. In one
notable case, the two factions engaged in an all-out war in Johnson County, Wyoming, following the lynching of a
homesteading couple. Id. at 86.
201
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890); see Valerie Weeks Scott, The Range Cattle Industry: Its Effect on
Western Land Law, 28 MONT. L. REV. 155, 160 (1967).
202
See Weeks Scott, supra note 201, at 163-64.
203
See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 85.
192
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A celebrated 1890 case exemplified many of the issues posed by the checkerboard pattern of
public and private lands.204 Buford, a cattle rancher205 running a stock-raising company in Utah,
sued several shepherds for alleged trespass on his land—the result of driving a herd of sheep across
a roughly 1,500-acre checkerboard area that included both public and private lands.206 By seeking
an injunction207 against the shepherds, Buford attempted to achieve in effect exclusive use of the
publicly owned parcels—and thus uninterrupted use of the entire checkerboard.208
The Utah territorial court declined to enjoin the shepherds, however, ruling that the usual rules
of trespass did not apply to unfenced public rangelands that were used almost exclusively for
livestock grazing.209 The court recognized the great hardship that an injunction would work on
nomadic shepherds, virtually preventing their use of public lands.210 The Supreme Court affirmed,
declaring that the shepherds possessed an implied license to access the public parcels, and therefore
could let their animals roam at large.211 The Court rejected Buford’s trespass claim, suggesting
that the rancher’s motive was to monopolize public lands:212
Of this 921,000 acres of land, the plaintiffs only assert title to 350,000 acres; that
is to say, being the owners of one-third of this entire body of land, which ownership
attaches to different sections and quarter sections scattered through the whole body
of it, they propose by excluding the defendants to obtain a monopoly of the whole
tract, while two-thirds of it is public land belonging to the United States . . . .213
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the public’s right of access to the public parcels, recognizing that
Buford’s right to exclude trespassers from his private lands could not be used to evict the public
from checkerboard lands, because the public had acquired an implied easement to access the
adjacent public property consistent with the western custom of allowing livestock to roam at
large.214
To protect their ability to continue to pasture, ranchers turned to fencing the public lands and
arming riders to defend them.215 In the 1880s, the government began taking action against fencing
public lands216 and, in 1885, Congress enacted the Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act, which
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Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
The company was a large concern, pasturing 20,000 head of cattle valued at $100,000 (in 1890 dollars). Id. at
322.
206
Id.
207
Id. at 325.
208
Id. at 325–26 (The stock-raisers “mainly, seek by the purchase and ownership of parts of these lands, detached
through a large body of the public domain, to exclude the defendants from the use of this public domain as a grazing
ground, while they themselves appropriate all of it to their own exclusive use.”).
209
Buford v. Houtz, 18 P. 633, 634 (Utah 1888).
210
Id.
211
133 U.S. at 326.
212
Id. at 332.
213
Id. at 325–26.
214
Id. at 327–28, 332.
215
See ROBBINS, supra note 69, at 250; Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 683–84 (1979) (explaining
that Congress’s motivation in enacting the Unlawful Inclosures Act was to respond to the range wars, in which
cattlemen sought “monopoly control” over the range by privatizing water sources and enclosing thousands of acres
of mixed public and private land with barbed wire).
216
The first anti-enclosure policies arrived through executive action—the Federal Lands Commissioner announced
that fencing would not be tolerated where it obstructed a settler’s entry. See Weeks Scott, supra note 201, at 169
(citing U.S. General Land Office, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER 30 (1883)).
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criminalized such fencing to prevent ranchers from monopolizing the rangeland.217
Nonetheless, ranchers and others continued to fence, obstructing public access to federal
lands.218 One creative method of fencing reached the Supreme Court in 1897. In 1894, the federal
government filed suit against Daniel Camfield and William Drury for enclosing some 20,000 acres
of public land in Colorado. Camfield and Drury purposefully refrained from building their fences
on the public checkerboard parcels, erecting them only on the private sections that they had
purchased from the Union Pacific Railway Company. 219 The government sought removal of the
fences, and the district court decided that the plain language of the Unlawful Inclosures Act
prohibited their activities.220 The Eighth Circuit affirmed.221
The Supreme Court agreed that Camfield and Drury had violated the Unlawful Inclosures Act,
finding that the law extended to fencing activities on private parcels within the checkerboard.222
The Court upheld the reach of the law as constitutional, reasoning that the federal government had
the power to abate nuisances affecting the public lands due to its ownership of and trusteeship over
publicly owned lands.223 Describing the federal trust duty as ensuring that the public retained fair
access to land resources, the Court explained that: “. . . it would be recreant to its duties as trustee
for the people of the United States to permit any individual or private corporation to monopolize
them for private gain, and thereby practically drive intending settlers from the market.” 224
Although Camfield and Drury claimed to be enclosing the land for the purpose of irrigating (rather
than ranching),225 the case set precedent for cattle fences as well.226
Despite judicial, congressional, and executive recognition of the public’s right of access, by
the end of the Nineteenth century, range-users had no ownership interest in the public range, or
even an explicit right to graze upon it. Instead, they possessed only an implied license, as the
Buford Court described it.227 Other resource users—miners in particular—had the right to obtain
an exclusive ownership interest in public lands, but ranchers could not. 228 Charles Wilkinson
217

Act of Feb. 25, 1885, ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1061); see Weeks Scott, supra note 201, at
169. The government did not file suits against enclosures under 160 acres unless the local United States Attorney
consulted the Secretary of the Interior. See id. According to one court, the intent of the statute was “to prevent the
inclosure and appropriation of vast tracts of public lands, said to be millions of acres in extent, by associations of
wealthy cattle owners, known as ‘cattle kings,’ without a shadow or pretense of title. These tracts were surrounded
by barbed wire fences, and all persons desirous of settling upon the lands under the laws of the United States were
vigorously excluded; in some cases by violence or threats.” United States v. Brandestein, 32 F. 738, 741 (N.D. Cal.
1887). Even companies headquartered on the East Coast and in England fenced in land in the West, claiming that a
man had a right to “as much range as he could fence.” See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 477 (citing S. DOC. NO. 48127 (1884)).
218
See, e.g., Caldwell v. Bush, 6 Wyo. 342 (Wyo. 1896); United States v. Bisel, 8 Mont. 20 (1888); Anthony
Wilkinson Livestock Co. v. McIlquam, 14 Wyo. 209 (Wyo. 1905).
219
United States v. Camfield, 59 F. 562, 562 (C.C.D. Colo. 1894).
220
Id. at 563.
221
Camfield v. United States, 66 F. 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1895).
222
Camfield, 167 U.S. at 528.
223
Id. at 525–26.
224
Id. at 524.
225
Id. at 524–26 (explaining that the federal government’s power under the Unlawful Inclosures Act to remove
fences sited on private lands inheres in the federal proprietary power and the related trustee duty to protect public
lands from injurious nuisance structures).
226
See Weeks Scott, supra note 201, at 170.
227
See 133 U.S. at 326; WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 88.
228
As one official wrote, “The laws of the United States in regard to the disposition of the public lands constitute a
barrier to the purchase of such lands in quantities sufficiently large for the conduct of the range and ranch cattle
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suggested that this dichotomy arose because of the rise of populism in the late Nineteenth century
and increased public opposition to privatization of large tracts of public land, especially in the
wake of controversy over large railroad holdings.229 Not until 1934 would graziers on unreserved
public lands obtain express permission for livestock use, and then only through a federal permit
system.230
V. ANTIMONOPOLY AND CONSERVATION
The antimonopoly strain in public land law reached its zenith around the turn of the Twentieth
century. The populist movement that dominated politics in rural America, especially in the
Midwest and South,231 sought regulatory reform of railroad monopolies and support for farmers in
debt.232 Roughly contemporaneously, a progressive movement evolved in urban America, also
calling for regulation of industry, rights of labor to organize, food safety regulation, and trustbusting. 233 The federal government, chiefly under the Theodore Roosevelt Administration,
responded to the apparent end of the American frontier by beginning to conserve the nation’s
public resources through establishing reserves, instituting permit systems, and retaining land in
public ownership while leasing certain resources. Antimonopoly principles were evident as the
government began actively managing public natural resources rather than simply privatizing
them.234
Turn-of-the-century Progressive conservationists envisioned public land management as a
prominent part of antimonopoly policy that provided opportunities to foster egalitarianism.235 The
Progressive antimonopoly impulse was a reaction to the failures of the previous policies.
Progressives emphasized (1) government withdrawal and reservation of lands from disposition,
(2) the introduction of resource leasing systems, (3) funding of large water projects designed to
business. This has resulted from the fact that the public sentiment of this country is and has always been strongly
opposed to the disposition of the public lands in large quantities, either to one person or to corporations.” H.R. EX.
DOC. NO. 267 (1884–85), quoted in Weeks Scott, supra note 201, at 159.
229
See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 88.
230
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934); See infra notes 316–21.
231
Populist Movement, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/470477/PopulistMovement (accessed March 17, 2015). An antecedent may have been the movement of state legislatures to curtail
“market hunting” of wildlife in the 1870s and 1880s, inspired in part by the nature writings of George Perkins
Marsh. See Erik Podhora, Lessons for Climate Change Reform from Environmental History: 19th Century Wildlife
Protection and the 20th Century Environmental Movement, 30 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 7–22 (2015).
232
See id.; see also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 58 (1955).
233
See id. at 196–212, 225–54. See also the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (requiring the
government to investigate trusts and combinations, and prohibiting the artificial raising of prices through anticompetitive monopoly agreements).
234
The advent of active public resource management was a sharp contrast from the management-by-disposition style
that existed in the mid-1800s. As Jedidiah Purdy described it, “Public lands were envisioned as being held in trust
for use by, and prompt disbursement to, the citizens who had the only ultimate and just claim to them. In this view,
if the federal government retained public lands, it set itself up as that bête noire of the era, a monopolist—the worst
kind, because it was both creator and beneficiary of the monopoly.” Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature, Climate
Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1142 (2010).
235
See Leonard Bates, Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907-1921, 44 MISS. VALLEY
HIST. REV. 29, 31 (1957) (“There were several ways to handle the monopolization of public resources . . .
[including] to hold on to the remaining public lands, at least temporarily, preventing further monopolization; [and]
to attempt to give the people a fuller share of opportunities and profits.”).
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produce widespread public benefits, and (4) preservation of resources like parks for the enjoyment
of future generations. In effect, the Progressive era of land reservation and conservation was a
consequence of widespread public dissatisfaction with the abuses of Nineteenth century public
land policies. These reforms eventually led to the end of the era of federal land disposition.
A.

RESERVATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. Timberland Reservations
Around the turn of the century, the government policy of unfettered privatization of public
resources led to overexploitation, particularly of timber and rangelands. Public concern over the
resource monopolization of forests led the federal government to withdraw lands from the
disposition laws otherwise applicable to the public domain.236 In 1891, Congress authorized the
President to reserve “public land bearing forests, in any part of the public lands wholly or in part
covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations .
. . .” 237 Presidents Harrison and Cleveland used this statutory authority to reserve tens of millions
of acres as forest reserves.238
Since Congress established no management policies for these forest reserves, Gifford Pinchot
remarked that the regime the reserves created was “clearly impossible. . . . [N]o timber could be
cut, no forage could be grazed, no minerals could be mined, nor any road built, in any Forest
Reserve.”239 Consequently, in 1897, Congress established policies for the forest reserves in the
National Forest Organic Administration Act, which called for improving and protecting forested
lands within reservations, securing favorable conditions of water flows, and furnishing a
continuous supply of timber.240 Congress passed the Act to maintain a priority for conservation of
the reserves, while allowing controlled commercial extractive uses of the forests.241 The Act gave
the government authority to allow the use of “such timber as can be spared without injury to the
forest when its use is a public necessity.” 242 Although the Organic Act rejected calls from some to
236

See James L. Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239, 258 (1977-78). The
impetus for the act was the vast misappropriation of public forest lands under the land disposition laws. See id. at
259.
237
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103.
238
See Huffman, supra note 236, at 260.
239
GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 85–86 (1947, 1998).
240
Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34–35. On the Organic Act’s purposes, see United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 707 n.14 (1979) (construing the statute’s purposes narrowly in the case of reserved water rights). The
1897 Organic Act was responsive to the concerns of Western states, which wanted working forests, not de facto
wilderness areas. See Huffman, supra note 236, at 262–64. The compromise came in the form of Senator Richard
Pettigrew’s amendment to the pending Civil Appropriations bill. His amendment ensured that the forest reserves
would be managed for sustained yield, contributing to the economy of the nation. Id.
241
See ch. 2, 30 Stat. at 35 (“For the purpose of preserving the living and growing timber and promoting the younger
growth on forest reservations, the Secretary of the Interior . . . may cause to be designated and appraised so much of
the dead, matured, or large growth of trees . . . as may be compatible with the utilization of the forests thereon, and
may sell the same . . . to be used in the State or Territory in which such timber reservation is situated [] but not for
export therefrom.”). The Act also provided that the Secretary could permit bona fide settlers, miners, and residents
to cut timber for firewood, building, mining, and other domestic purposes. Id.
242
W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 951 (1975) (quoting 25 CONG. REC.
H2374 (1893) (statement of Congressman McRae, Chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, upon
introducing an 1893 version of the bill)).
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forbid all timber harvesting in reserves, it limited the authority of the Secretary to the sale of dead
and physiologically mature trees.243 The Act did not authorize clearcuts of merchantable timber in
forest reserves;244 however, clearcuts became commonplace in the post-World War II era to meet
the demand for new housing.245
Gifford Pinchot,246 the father of the conservation movement and the first Forest Service Chief,
established an antimonopoly ethic for administering the reservations. His philosophy contained a
large dose of utilitarian sentiment, maintaining that the management of the forests should provide
the greatest good for the greatest number over the long-run: “In the administration of the forest
reserves it must be clearly borne in mind that all land is to be devoted to its most productive use
for the permanent good of the whole people, and not for the temporary benefit of individuals or
companies.”247 Pinchot viewed the Forest Service as the first agency to assert that the “small man”
should be the priority user of natural resources of the West: “Better to help a poor man make a
living for his family than help a rich man get richer still. That was our battle cry.” 248 The Pinchot
ethic reflected Progressive opposition to the monopolistic excesses of the Nineteenth century.249
2. Coal, Oil, and Gas Withdrawals
Until the end of the Nineteenth century, federal policy allowed oil, gas, and shale on public
land to be located and privatized like other minerals under the Mining Act of 1872. In 1897,
Congress passed the Oil Placer Act, confirming that fuel minerals were subject to open discovery
and development, free of charge, with the vesting of a right to mine upon discovery of a valuable
mineral.250 But coal lands had their own legislation, enacted in 1873, limiting the extent of claims
to 160 acres for individuals and 320 acres for associations,251 although companies were claiming

Id. at 952 (“that the living trees shall be preserved that is, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior so
that the large trees, the dying trees, the trees that will grow no better in time, may be sold and removed by the
purchaser . . . .” quoting 30 CONG. REC. 909 (1897) (statement of Sen. Pettigrew)). In fact, to allow the Forest
Service to continue to engage in clearcutting, Congress amended the Forest Rangelands Renewable Resources
Planning Act in 1976. National Forest Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 6, 90 Stat. 2949, 2952-56 (1976).
For further discussion, see infra § V.
244
522 F.2d. at 952.
245
See infra notes 374–80 and accompanying text, discussing the advent of the National Forests Management Act,
which accommodated and regulated the clearcutting practices of the Forest Service.
246
Pinchot became the first Chief of the Forest Service after Congress transferred jurisdiction over the forest
reserves from the Interior to the Agriculture Department in 1905. See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 90–92.
247
Letter from the Secretary of Agriculture (Feb. 1, 1905) (quoted in PINCHOT, supra note 239, at 261). Pinchot
wrote the letter himself, but styled it as a directive from the Secretary and had it signed by him. Id. at 260. See also
WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 128; USFS History: Gifford Pinchot, FOREST HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/People/Pinchot/Pinchot.aspx (last updated May 1, 2015).
248
PINCHOT, supra note 239, at 259.
249
See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 128; PINCHOT, supra note 239, at 507 (“Monopoly on the loose is a source of
many of the economic, political, and social evils which afflict the sons of men. Its abolition or regulation is an
inseparable part of the conservation policy.”)
250
Oil Placer Act of 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526 (“any person authorized to enter lands under the mining laws of the
United States may enter and obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils, and chiefly valuable
therefor, under the provisions of the laws relating to placer mineral claims.”)
251
Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 279, § 1, 17 Stat. 607, 607.
243
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much more, flouting antimonopoly policy through fraudulent entries.252
Progressives believed that the fuel minerals, like public forests and navigable waterways, were
the equivalent of public utilities, not private commodities.253 Yet coal and railway companies
ignored the acreage limitations of the 1873 coal statute by making fraudulent entries under it and
other public land laws.254 Thus, in 1906, Theodore Roosevelt began to use his executive authority
to withdraw mineral lands from the operation of the General Mining Law. 255 That year, he
withdrew sixty-six million acres of known coal deposits.256 Three years later, in 1909, President
Taft withdrew over three million acres of oil lands in California and Wyoming in the wake of a
U.S. Geological Survey report showing that the oil lands were being privatized at such an alarming
rate that the government would soon have no option but to buy oil back from private claimants.257
Privatization of public oil reserves threatened national security, since the Navy needed oil as it
shifted from coal to oil-powered ships in the years before World War I.258
Earlier, in tandem with his policy of withdrawals, President Roosevelt advocated a leasing
system as the best way to maintain federal title in the minerals, avoid resource monopoly, and
provide benefits to the public.259 However, not until 1920 did Congress enact a leasing system for
coal, gas, oil, and other “minerals,” as discussed below in subsection C.
B.

ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND EFFICIENT DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD

By the end of the Nineteenth century, it became apparent that federal disposition policies failed
to spur productive use of all cultivable lands. The Desert Land Act did not yield the results its
drafters intended. Although the statute granted settlers more land—640 acres instead of 160
acres—the large amount made it difficult for settlers to fulfill the Act’s irrigation requirement.260
Irrigation was no easy undertaking; construction of dams and canals was not practicable for most
individuals, and difficult even for collectives. 261 Consequently, in 1894, Congress passed the
See United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 169 (1890) (each person is “permitted to enter
not exceeding 160 acres, while ‘associations of persons,’ severally qualified, as above, may enter not exceeding 320
acres. The object of these restrictions as to quantity was, manifestly, to prevent monopolies in these coal lands.”).
253
See Statement of Theodore Roosevelt, Feb. 13, 1907, in GATES, supra note 6, at 728 (citing 41st CONG. REC.
H2806–08 (1907)).
254
See GATES, supra note 6, at 726.
255
See id. at 726–27 (describing Roosevelt’s first withdrawals of coal lands in Colorado, North Dakota, Montana,
Oregon, Washington, Utah, Wyoming, and the Territories of New Mexico and Alaska).
256
See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 50 (explaining that a withdrawal is like a zoning requirement that prohibits a
specific use. Roosevelt used the withdrawals to prohibit further fraudulent entries of coal lands).
257
See GATES, supra note 6, at 732. This executive withdrawal came before Congress recognized a presidential
power to withdraw federal land from settlement, location, sale, or entry in 1910. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36
Stat. 847. However, the Supreme Court upheld the 1909 withdrawal, under the theory that Congress had impliedly
consented to Roosevelt’s exercise of power; over the years, the executive had issued orders setting aside public
lands for military and Indian reservations, and Congress declined to exercise its power to override them. United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474–75 (1915).
258
See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, § 39:2. The United States was following Britain’s lead; Winston
Churchill had the foresight to shift to oil-powered ships, which gave the Allies a considerable advantage in World
War I.
259
See GATES, supra note 6, at 728.
260
Desert Land Act, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377 (1877) (requiring a claimant to declare that he intends to reclaim
a tract of desert land not exceeding one section (640 acres), and to irrigate that section within three years).
261
See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 243.
252
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Carey Act 262 to encourage private capital investment into irrigation projects. To provide an
incentive to states to encourage irrigation facilities, the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to grant thousands of federal acres, sell irrigable public lands to “actual settlers” in tracts no larger
than 160 acres, and provide incentives to states to supervise and encourage irrigation works.263
The Carey Act’s reliance on the states to finance irrigation works was a reaction to the
undercapitalized or fraudulent claims commonplace under the Desert Land Act, but it failed to
produce efficient or workable infrastructure.264
In 1902, the federal government began actively encouraging arid lands reclamation by
providing irrigation to small homesteaders.265 The Reclamation Act authorized the Secretary of
the Interior to locate and construct irrigation works for the storage, diversion, and development of
streams and rivers.266 The statute had two primary purposes: (1) to promote national development
in the West and (2) to distribute its benefits widely, rather than allow them to be monopolized by
the few.267 The Act’s antimonopoly policy268 limited ownership of lands irrigated with reclamation
water to 160 acres and required the owner to be a bona fide resident of the irrigated land.269 The
acreage limitation echoed the Homestead Act, reaffirming the basic public domain disposition
principle that public lands and resources should inhere to the benefit of many, but it was ignored
in practice and later liberalized by Congress.270
Progressives also promoted the antimonopoly policy that streamflows are publicly owned.271

262

Carey Act, ch. 301 § 4, 28 Stat. 372, 422 (1894).
Id. § 4, 28 Stat. at 422. Senator William Stewart estimated that the West offered 75 to 100 million acres of
irrigable arid land. By 1899, irrigation reached only 7.2 million of these acres. See GATES, supra note 6, at 651. The
Carey Act had an especially large effect on Idaho, whose population increased with the increase in irrigated acreage.
Between 1900 and 1920, irrigated acreage in the state increased from 40,000 to 620,000 acres. At the same time,
population increased from over 5,000 people to nearly 70,000. See Hugh T. Lovin, The Carey Act in Idaho, 18951925: An Experiment in Free Enterprise Reclamation, 78 PAC. NW. Q. 122, 126 (1987).
264
See HIBBARD, supra note 39, at 429 (“In Wyoming a great deal of so-called ditching was done by plowing a few
furrows or by cutting a ditch one foot deep where eight feet were needed. Moreover, these ditches failed to follow
the contour of the land with reference to the habits of water, and often they began where there was no water to be
conducted and ended where there was no field to receive it . . . .”).
265
See Paul S. Taylor, Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CAL. L. REV. 978, 980 (1964) (citing
REPORT BY THE COMM. OF SPECIAL ADVISERS ON RECLAMATION, S. DOC. NO. 92, at 111 (1924)).
266
Newlands Act of June 17, 1902, Pub L. No. 57–161 § 2, 32 Stat. 388, 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §
391 (2012)).
267
See Taylor, supra note 265, at 979 (citing HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARID LANDS, REPORT ON RECLAMATION AND
ARID LANDS, H.R. REP. NO. 1468, at 3 (1902)). Taylor explained that the Reclamation Act required the Secretary of
the Interior to prevent ineligible lands—those in excess of the 160 acre limitation—from receiving project water. His
analysis centered on the underground deliveries of water to high-concentration ownership lands in the San Joaquin
Valley in the 1960s, which were ineligible for project water because they were owned in parcels of greater than 160
acres. Id. at 982.
268
See Taylor, supra note 265, at 979 (describing § 5 of the Act as “the legal instrument for effectuating the
antimonopoly policy of the law.”).
269
Newlands Act, supra note 266, at 389 (“No right to the use of water for land in private ownership shall be sold
for a tract exceeding one hundred and sixty acres to any one landowner, and no such sale shall be made to any
landowner unless he be an actual bona fide resident on such land, or occupant thereof residing in the neighborhood
of said land . . . .”).
270
See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 97 (7th ed. 2014).
271
Concerning the use of streamflows for irrigation, President Roosevelt said, “The constant purpose of the
Government in connection with the Reclamation Service has been to use the water resources of the public lands for
the ultimate greatest good of the greatest number; in other words, to put upon the land permanent home-makers, to
263
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This principle supported both the Progressive irrigation agenda and became a means to forestall
growing monopolization of the emerging electric power industry. President Roosevelt promoted
antimonopoly policies in his Inland Waterways Commission in 1908. The Commission declared
that water was a public resource and recommended comprehensive basin-wide federal planning to
serve the multiple purposes of navigation, flood control, irrigation, and hydropower. 272
The Roosevelt Administration pursued antimonopoly policy in hydroelectric power project
development, and the president vetoed grants of power sites to private companies.273 Congress
proposed such grants on unlimited terms, which the president considered to be monopolistic.274 In
his veto of a site grant for a dam on the James River, he declared:
[T]he great corporations are acting with foresight, singleness of purpose, and vigor
to control the water powers of the country. They pay no attention to state
boundaries, and are not interested in the Constitutional law affecting navigable
streams . . . I esteem it my duty to use every endeavor to prevent the growing
monopoly, the most threatening which has ever appeared, from being fastened upon
the people of this nation.275
Both Roosevelt and Taft vetoed statutes granting power sites of unrestrained duration to private
parties.276
In 1920, Congress included antimonopoly policies in the Federal Power Act’s regulation of
private hydropower development on navigable waterways. 277 The Act contained multiple
antimonopoly elements. First, it imposed a limit of a fifty-year license term, reserving ownership

use and develop it for themselves and for their children and children's children.” Theodore Roosevelt, State of the
Union Address (Dec. 3, 1907).
272
See Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest’s Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 185 (1983). The Army Corps of Engineers, the
nation’s principal navigation agency, succeeded in blocking efforts to give the Inland Waterways Commission
authority over river basin planning. See Robert M. Utley & Barry Mackintosh, The Department of Everything Else:
Highlights of Interior History, 13 PUB. HISTORIAN 89, text between nn.37–38 (1989),
http://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/utley-mackintosh/index.htm [hereinafter Interior History].
273
The Forest Service under Pinchot produced the first policy of limiting rights-of-way for water power production
to fifty years and charging a fee to developers who sited projects in forest reserves. See Gifford Pinchot, The Long
Struggle for Effective Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 12-15 (1946).
274
43rd CONG. REC. H978 (1909) (“The [James River] bill gives to the grantee a valuable privilege which by its
very nature is monopolistic and does not contain the conditions to protect the public interest.”) (statement of the
Speaker of the House, delivering a message of the President).
275
Pinchot, supra note 273, at 17 (citing 43 CONG. REC. 979–80 (1909)).
276
Id. at 17–18 (citing 48th CONG. REC. 11796 (1912)).
277
Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). Congress later applied similar antimonopoly principles
to a public project in the 1937 enactment of the Bonneville Power Administration. The Bonneville Act called for
widespread use of the electricity produced by the dams on the Columbia River: “In order to insure that the facilities
for the generation of electric energy at the Bonneville project shall be operated for the benefit of the general public,
and particularly of domestic and rural consumers, the administrator shall at all times, in disposing of electric energy
generated at said project, give preference and priority to public bodies and cooperatives.” Bonneville Project Act,
ch. 720, § 4, 50 Stat. 731, 733 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 832c(a) (2012)). Prices charged for the power
were to be established with a view to encouraging the “widest possible, diversified use of electric energy” at uniform
rates throughout prescribed transmission areas in order to “encourage the equitable distribution of electric energy. . .
.” Id. § 6, 50 Stat. 731, 735 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 832e (2012)). See MICHAEL C. BLUMM,
SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 92–93
(2002).
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of streamflows to the public. 278 Second, the statute included a preference for publicly-owned
developments.279 Third, it contained a requirement that a licensed facility had to be best adapted
to a comprehensive scheme of improvement and use for navigation, water-power development,
and other beneficial public uses.280 Fourth, it prohibited combinations for the purpose of limiting
electrical distribution or price fixing.281 Fifth, the Act required that the rates charged for the power
generated from licensed facilities be “reasonable and just” to the customer.282 In short, the 1920
law required private water developments to satisfy a variety of antimonopolistic purposes.
C.

THE MINERAL LEASING ACT

Congress finally created a leasing system for coal, oil and gas, and other fuel and fertilizer
minerals in the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”),283 ending the federal policy of granting or
selling fossil fuels and fertilizers.284 The statute was the culmination of the Progressive effort to
end disposition by capture for fuel minerals, making coal, phosphates, oil, gas, and oil shale subject
to a leasing program. Congress adopted the leasing system for these minerals to stop their outright
disposition under the mining and other laws and “to promote conservation, to secure proper
methods of development and operation, to prevent speculation and encourage bona fide
exploration and development and to prevent monopoly of mineral fuels and fertilizers, which were
regarded as public utility in character.”285 No longer would there be a “right to mine” for fuel and
fertilizer minerals; the right of self-initiation under the 1872 Act was replaced with a requirement
to obtain permission from the federal government to prospect. The MLA gave the federal
government broad discretion to decide whether to lease, to whom to lease, and the terms with
which the lessee had to comply.286 Also, unlike the 1872 Mining Law, the MLA authorized the
federal government to obtain an economic return in the form of rents and royalties.287
The major antimonopoly contributions of the MLA as enacted were the limits it placed on the
number of leases and acreage allowed under each lease. No person, association, or corporation
could hold more than one coal lease during the life of that lease in any one state. 288 Nor could a
person, association, or corporation hold more than three oil or gas leases granted under the Act in
278

Id. § 6, 41 Stat. at 1067 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 799 (maximum fifty-year license terms)).
Id. § 7, 41 Stat. at 1067 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (public preference)).
280
Id. § 10(a), 41 Stat. at 1068 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (best adapted to a comprehensive plan)).
281
Id. § 10(h), 41 Stat. at 1070 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 803(h) (monopolistic combinations)).
282
Id. § 20, 41 Stat. at 1073 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 813 (requiring interstate power to be reasonably priced)).
283
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.).
284
See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, at § 39:2.
285
Harry Edelstein, Federal Oil and Gas Leasing of Public and Acquired Lands, 24 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 301, 302
(1952). Edelstein was the Assistant Solicitor for Public Lands at the time of his publication.
286
See United States ex rel McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (upholding the Secretary’s reading of the
MLA as authorizing the discretionary rejection of oil and gas exploration applications and invoking United States v.
Grimaud to uphold the federal government’s rejection of the applications in the interest of the public welfare and the
protection of federally-owned natural resources). Unlike the General Mining Law, the MLA allowed the government
to choose who could extract the resource and where through competitive auction. The Act also included several
provisions denying its benefits to any claimant who had been previously found guilty of fraud. See, e.g., ch. 85 § 19,
41 Stat. at 449.
287
See, e.g., ch. 85 § 14, 41 Stat. at 442.
288
§ 27, 41 Stat. at 448. The modern statute has converted this to statewide and nationwide aggregation limits of not
more than “75,000 acres in any one State and in no case greater than an aggregate of 150,000 acres in the United
States.” 30 U.S.C. § 184(a) (2012).
279
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any one state, or more than one lease within the geologic structure of the same oil or gas field.289
Moreover, no person or corporation could hold an interest as a member of an association or as a
stockholder which would, aggregated with other interests that person or member had, exceed the
maximum number of acres of the respective kinds of minerals allowed to any one lessee under the
Act.290 The MLA also limited the amount of acreage a person, association, or corporation could
lease in one unit, restricting coal leases to 2,560 acres each,291 oil and gas leases to 640 acres,292
and oil shale leases to 5,120 acres.293 Notably, the law provided for royalty-free local and domestic
use by small users,294 and restricted any railroad company’s ability to hold coal leases to the extent
needed for its own purposes.295
On the other hand, the Act allowed indefinite lease terms for coal 296 and oil shale,297 and
created a preferential right of renewal for oil and gas leases of twenty-year primary lease terms.298
Implementation of fossil fuel leasing fell short of antimonopoly goals, however, as leases were
readily extended, a practice which continues to this day.299 However, the MLA’s core limits on
289

MLA § 27, 41 Stat. at 448. The modern provision limits aggregation in any one state (other than Alaska) to
246,080 acres. 30 U.S.C. § 184(d). In Alaska, the limit is 300,000 in the northern leasing district, and the same in the
southern leasing district. Id.
290
MLA § 27, 41 Stat. at 448. Under the law today, persons may still not aggregate beyond the statutory limits, but
no person is charged with his pro rata share of any acreage holdings of a corporation unless he owns more than ten
percent of the corporation’s stock. 30 U.S.C. § 184(e).
291
MLA § 2–5, 41 Stat. at 438–39; 30 U.S.C. § 205. Today, individual coal leases can be consolidated into a
“logical mining unit,” not to exceed 25,000 acres. Id. § 202a(7). A “logical mining unit” can consist of multiple
federal leaseholds, and may include intervening or contiguous lands in which the federal government does not own
the coal resources, but are under the control of one operator. Id. § 202a(1).
292
MLA § 14, 41 Stat. at 442 (upon discovery, allowing the permittee to lease one-fourth of the prospecting permit,
which may have been as large as 2,560 acres); id. § 17, 41 Stat. at 443 (allowing unappropriated deposits of oil or
gas to be leased to the highest bidder in areas not exceeding 640 acres). Now, lease units on known producing fields
are limited to 5,760 acres in Alaska and 2,560 acres elsewhere. 30 U.S.C.A. § 226(b) (West 2014).
293
MLA § 21, 41 Stat. at 446. The modern statute permits oil shale leases up to 5,760 acres. 30 U.S.C. § 241(a)(2).
294
MLA § 8, 41 Stat. at 440 (allowing individuals and municipalities to hold permits for household use, not for sale,
and excluding corporations from the benefits of the provision); 30 U.S.C. § 208.
295
MLA § 2, 41 Stat. at 438 (also restricting railroad coal leases to one permit per 200 miles of its line); 30 U.S.C. §
202.
296
MLA § 7, 41 Stat. at 439. Congress subjected the indeterminate period of the lease to a condition of diligent
development, to prevent companies from sitting on the leases for purposes of speculation. Congress strengthened
this anti-speculation provision of the MLA in Section 3 of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act (“FCLAA”)
of 1975 by banning the issuance of new leases to lessees holding nonproductive leases for more than ten years after
FCLAA’s enactment. See Sam Kalen, Where Do We Go From Here?: The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act—
Past, Present, and Future, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (1996). Under the FCLAA, the primary lease term is
twenty years, “and for so long thereafter as coal is produced annually in commercial quantities from that lease.” 30
U.S.C. § 207(a) (2012). Logical Mining Units must be mined within a period of no greater than forty years, unless
the Secretary makes findings that a longer period would be conducive to maximum economic recovery. Id. §
202a(2). See Kalen, supra, at 1042–43.
297
MLA, ch. 85 § 21, 41 Stat. at 446. The indeterminate nature of the lease is subject to “such conditions as may be
imposed by the Secretary of the Interior, including covenants relative to . . . productive development,” indicating
Congress’s desire to prevent speculative holdings.
298
Id. § 17, 41 Stat. at 443. The Act provided a preferential right of renewal for periods of ten years at the expiration
of the twenty-year term. Id. The primary lease term for onshore leasing is now ten years. 30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (2012).
Leases producing “paying quantities” of minerals may be extended indefinitely through secondary leases. Id.; see
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, at § 39:18.
299
See Huber, supra note 12, at 1009 (noting that “unlike private lessors, the United States sometimes tries harder to
keep leases in force than to terminate them,” and the federal government goes to “seemingly absurd lengths . . . of
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acreage and aggregation reflected the Progressive era’s antimonopolistic values of spreading the
benefits of publicly owned resources widely while minimizing control of minerals in the hands of
the few.
D.

CONSERVATION FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS

The Progressive era introduced another antimonopoly sentiment in the National Park Service
Organic Act of 1916—that of intergenerational sharing.300 The objective of the Act is to “conserve
the scenery and the national and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such a manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.” 301 These policies were significant antimonopoly statements
because the non-impairment standard limited the use of park resources by the current generation
to ensure that future generations may enjoy the reserves in a relatively preserved state, making
clear that the current generation has no monopoly on use. Interior Secretary Franklin Lane, who
interpreted the Act to require the National Park Service to manage the parks for “the use
observation, health and pleasure of the people,” stated that “the national interest must dictate all
decisions affecting public or private enterprise in the parks,” 302 reflecting the antimonopoly
sentiment of limiting privatization.303
The statute did not create off-limits wilderness parks, but rather perpetuated the antimonopoly
leniency” in comparison to private lessors. For example, federal law allows leases to be extended much more readily
than in typical private transactions). One notorious example of a monopolistic giveaway was the Powder River coal
lease sale during the early 1980s. Although a court decided that environmentalists had failed to prove that the sale
was below-market value, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 871 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1989), a government study
disagreed with the court, finding that the Interior Department offered excessive amounts of coal leases in a declining
market. See generally COMM’N ON FAIR MARKET VALUE POL’Y FOR FED. COAL LEASING, REP. OF THE COMMISSION:
FAIR MARKET VALUE POLICY FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASING (1984) (also suggesting that courts lack the expertise or
will to police fair market valuation issues).
300
Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408 § 1, 39 Stat. 535 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–18f (2012) (repealed Pub. L. 113–
287, § 3, 128 Stat. 3094 (2014) (moving National Parks legislation to Title 54)). The National Parks Service Organic
Act of 1916 sought to establish a new type of reserve, a non-extractive landscape. Congress had declared a handful
of so-called “National Parks” already under its Property Clause power. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. These were
Yellowstone, Yosemite, Sequoia, Mount Rainier, Crater Lake, Glacier, and Rocky Mountain National Parks. See
ROBERT B. KEITER, TO CONSERVE UNIMPAIRED 232 (2013). Note that the seeds of intergenerational preservation of
Yosemite began in 1864, when the United States granted Yosemite to California on the condition that “ the premises
shall be held for public use, resort, and recreation” and shall be “inalienable for all time.” Act of June 30, 1864, ch.
184 § 1, 13 Stat. 325, 325. The federal government reacquired the Yosemite Valley in 1906. See Collins v. Yosemite
Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 523–26 (1938) (detailing the history of Yosemite National Park). In the modern
era, Congress has continued to frame management directives in terms of intergenerational sharing. For example, the
enacting language of the Steens Mountain Cooperative Management and Protection Area Act of 2000 required the
Secretary of the Interior to “conserve, protect, and manage the long-term ecological integrity of Steens Mountain for
future and present generations.” Pub. L. No. 106–399, §102, 114 Stat. 1655, 1658–59 (2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 460nnn-12 (2012)).
301
16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (repealed 2014); 54 U.S.C.A. § 100101 (West 2015).
302
See KEITER, supra note 300, at 9 (citing letter of Interior Secretary Franklin Lane (May 13, 1918)).
303
Secretary Lane believed that protecting the parks required the agency to guard against entrenched privatization,
stating that the Parks Service must “faithfully preserve the parks for posterity in essentially their natural state. The
commercial use of these reservations, except as specially authorized by law, or such as may be incidental to the
accommodation and entertainment of visitors, will not be permitted under any circumstances.” Letter of Interior
Secretary Franklin Lane (May 13, 1918).
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theme of public access.304 For example, the Act’s statement of purpose directs the National Park
Service to “conserve” the land, rather than merely “preserve” it as the enacting statutes of the
original parks had called for. 305 The National Park Service statutes therefore allowed some
consumptive uses in the parks, such as leasing for tourism accommodations for periods of no
longer than twenty years.306 Grazing was also a permissible park use, cabined by the requirement
that grazing not be detrimental to the primary purposes of the park.307 Although the Organic Act
authorizes commercial park concessionaires,308 the statute clearly forbids the Park Service from
encumbering the public’s access to natural curiosities, wonders, or objects of interest by leasing or
granting those areas to private concerns.309
E.

MANAGING GRAZING LANDS

Public access to federal lands reflects the antimonopoly impulse when access is shared among
the many, rather than privatized by a few or committed to a single use. In the Nineteenth century,
free and unrestricted use of public lands for grazing was a boon to private cattle and sheep graziers.
But in 1906, the Forest Service revoked the implied license to graze that the Supreme Court
recognized in its 1890 Buford v. Houtz decision.310 Realizing that overgrazing was degrading the
range, Pinchot invoked Organic Act authority 311 to promulgate regulations imposing a permit
requirement and charge fees for grazing on national forest lands. 312 The regulation reflected
antimonopoly sentiment by ending free and unrestricted grazing, thereby removing a major
subsidy for large rangeland users. Pinchot intended the permit requirement and fees, which were
tied to the amount of forage grazers consumed, to prevent excessive grazing by individual ranchers

304

Multiple-Use surfaces as a major antimonopoly doctrine in the 1960s, as discussed infra Part V.
See RICHARD W. SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 43 (1997) (explaining that the
conservation movement comprised a wide array of concerns, “of which the wise use of scenic lands in the national
parks to foster tourism and public enjoyment was very much a part.”).
306
Act of Aug. 25, 1916, ch. 408 § 3, 39 Stat. 535, 535. Today, the Secretary can award concession contracts for up
to twenty years (54 U.S.C.A. § 101914 (West 2015)), but may provide a preferential right to renew contracts to
outfitters, guide services, and smaller contracts. 54 U.S.C.A. § 101913 (West 2015).
307
SELLARS, supra note 305, at 44; ch. 408 § 3, 39 Stat. 535, 535; 16 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (repealed 2014); 54
U.S.C.A. § 102101 (West 2015).
308
16 U.S.C. § 5952 (2012) (repealed 2014); 54 U.S.C.A. § 101913 (West 2015).
309
16 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (repealed 2014); 54 U.S.C.A. § 102101 (West 2015). Today, National Parks concessions are
governed also by the Concessions Management Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 105–391, Title IV § 402, 112 Stat.
3503 (1998). The statute requires that contracts for visitor facilities and services be limited to those that are
“necessary and appropriate for public use and enjoyment” of the park and that they “are consistent to the highest
practicable degree with the preservation and conservation” of the park. 54 U.S.C.A. § 101912 (West 2015).
310
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
311
See PINCHOT, supra note 239, at 271–72 (describing Pinchot’s elicitation of a letter from the Attorney General
confirming his authority under the Organic Act of 1897 to impose a fee-permit scheme within the forest reserves).
312
Forest Service Reg. 45 (June 12, 1906). The permit system required grazers to pay a fee of five cents per animal
unit month (“AUM”). WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 91. An AUM is the amount of forage ingested by one cow, or
about five sheep, grazing about 700 to 800 pounds of plant matter for a month. See id.; COGGINS & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 183, § 33:7.
305
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on the forest reserves. 313 The regulation also created a safe harbor for subsistence grazers,314
exempting small users from the permitting fees imposed on large commercial operations.
The fee program did not go unchallenged. In 1911, the Supreme Court upheld the Secretary of
Agriculture’s power under the Organic Act to impose a grazing fee with criminal penalties for
non-compliance. 315 In a decision issued on the same day, the Court invoked a trust theory of
ownership to support the power of the federal government to restrict grazing.316 “All the public
lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole country,” wrote Justice Lamar, who
declared that the federal government could even ban pasturage on its lands altogether if necessary
to fulfill its custodial duty. 317 The opinion proclaimed that “these are rights incident to
proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the property
belonging to it.”318 Thus, the agency could choose to permit, curtail, or eliminate grazing, in order
to prevent the degradation that comes with monopoly of use. This 1911 decision clearly recognized
the federal role as both trustee and proprietor of the public lands, each role justifying restricting
consumptive uses, reserving some lands for various purposes, and conditioning the use of
resources. These measures all reflect antimonopoly sentiments.
F.

BEYOND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: ANTIMONOPOLY AND GRAZING ON LANDS OUTSIDE NATIONAL
FORESTS

On public lands outside the national forests, the imposition of a permit-and-fee system for
grazing remained a contentious proposition. Competition for the forage resource was intense in
the late 1800s, and established stockmen used various means to claim exclusive use of the range.319

United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911) (“These fees were fixed to prevent excessive grazing, and
thereby protect the young growth and native grasses from destruction, and to make a slight income with which to
meet the expenses of management.”).
314
The Forest Service exempted “the few head [of cattle] in actual use by prospectors, campers, and travelers, and
milch or work animals, not exceeding a total of six head, owned by bona fide settlers residing in or near a forest
reserve . . . .” Forest Service Reg. 45 (June 12, 1906).
315
Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 522–23 (deciding that the Organic Act authorized the agency to promulgate regulations
providing for the penalty, citing the statutory duty to protect the forest reserves from depredations). Although the
statute did not declare it unlawful to graze sheep without a permit, it did require that users of the forest reserves
comply “with the rules and regulations covering said forest reservation.” Id. at 521. The Court ruled that statute did
not unconstitutionally delegate a legislative power, because the statute required the Secretary to protect the forests
from harmful uses. Id. at 522.
316
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537–38 (1911) (rejecting a rancher’s claim of an implied license to graze
upon the forest lands and upholding Pinchot’s regulations requiring a permit). In effect, the regulation revoked the
grazers’ implied right to graze on federal public lands the Court recognized in Buford v. Houtz; see supra note 207.
Pinchot’s allies in the Department of the Interior attempted to bring grazing permits and fees to Interior-managed
lands, but “[c]ontroversy among cattle men, sheepmen, farmers, and watershed protectionists doomed the grazing
program.” Utley & Mackintosh, supra note 272, at text between notes 37–38.
317
Light, 220 U.S. at 537 (“in the exercise of the same trust [Congress] may disestablish a reserve, and devote the
property to some other national and public purpose.”).
318
Id.
319
See George Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 23–27 (1982) (describing how established ranchers acquired title to
land through homestead fraud, acquiring riparian areas to monopolize water supplies, claiming “rights” to the range
through private agreements with other local ranchers, taking possession by effectively excluding others with fences);
see also Interior History, supra note 272, at text between notes 37–38 (“controversy over cattlemen, sheep men,
313
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By the 1930s, that competition had caused severe deterioration and erosion of the resource.320
Although President Theodore Roosevelt had urged Congress to regulate grazing on the public
domain, opposition prevented enactment of a Progressive era statute. 321 To counteract
monopolization, the rangeland commons required regulation through mutually agreed upon
coercion.322
Congress ultimately enacted the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934 in response to the rangeland
deterioration that contributed to the Dust Bowl. 323 The Taylor Act authorized the Secretary of
Interior to divide the unreserved public domain into grazing districts and issue permits for
predetermined levels of livestock grazing in each district. The antimonopoly aspects of the law
included: (1) revoking the implied license to graze the public domain, requiring permits and
imposing a user fee;324 (2) authorizing the Secretary to adjust or cancel permits when necessary to
protect public rangelands;325 (3) limiting permit terms to ten years;326 (4) expressly declaring that
no private property inhered in the permit to graze;327 and (5) calling for (via a 1939 amendment)
district advisory boards (comprised largely of local ranchers)—establishing a sort of “range
democracy.”328

farmers, and watershed protectionists doomed the grazing program” that would have established a leasing program
aimed at range carrying capacity).
320
See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 319, at 47 (citing E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN 221 (1951)) (“Overgrazed, wind-eroded expanses, interspersed with rocky peaks and barren slopes, were all
that remained of the public domain in 1934.”).
321
Opposition came from “those who do not make their homes on the land, but who own wandering bands of sheep
that are driven hither and thither to eat out the land and render it worthless for the real home maker,” along with “the
men who have already obtained control of great areas of the public land . . . who object . . . because it will break the
control that these few big men now have over the lands which they do not actually own.” PUBLIC LAND SITUATION
IN THE UNITED STATES, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, S. DOC. NO. 310, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1907).
322
“Surely it is in accordance with the spirit of our government to pass a law in the interest of the actual settler,
instead of to leave undisturbed the present system in the interest of those who monopolize an improper proportion of
the public domain, or of others who are indifferent to whether in the long run they destroy the worth of the public
domain.” Id. at 5–6. See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (“The
rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And
another; and another. . . . Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” Id. at 1244. Hardin
explained succinctly the idea that regulatory limits allow the commons to be enjoyed by many, rather than robbed by
few. Id. at 1247).
323
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269. The purposes of the Act were “to stop injury to the public
grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, to stabilize the
livestock industry dependent upon the public range, and for other purposes.” Id. The dire erosion and ecological
deterioration wrought on the Dust Bowl plains motivated policymakers to conserve what remained of the soils in the
public domain. See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 319, at 46–47.
324
Id. § 3.
325
Id.; 43 C.F.R. §§ 160.26(a) – (f) (1938), 43 C.F.R. § 160.30 (1938).
326
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 48 Stat. at 1271.
327
Id. See also United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (determining that neither the permit nor the value it
adds to the base ranch are compensable property rights). Congress intended that “no compensable property might be
created in the permit lands themselves as a result of the issuance of the permit. Given that intent, it would be
unusual, we think, for Congress to have turned around and authorized compensation for the value added to fee lands
by their potential use in connection with permit lands.” Id.
328
Act of July 14, 1939, ch. 270, 53 Stat. 1002 (each range district also had a wildlife representative). See Coggins
& Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 319, at 48. Notably, however, advisory boards were composed generally of
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On the one hand, the Taylor Act brought the first form of statutory governance to the
overburdened commons of the plains, disrupting the informal monopoly of claimed private rights
that had evolved there.329 However, the statutorily authorized advisory boards created conditions
ripe for governmental capture.330 The Act and its regulations also created preference grazing rights
for landowners adjacent to public lands, which limited the antimonopoly effect of the law.331 The
statute established a preference for issuing permits to landowners within or near the district who
were engaged in the livestock business, bona fide settlers, or owners of water rights. 332 This
preference system effectively perpetuated the rangeland status quo.333 In fact, George Coggins
claimed that the immediate effect of the Taylor Act was “exclusionary and monopolistic,”
especially because nomadic sheepherders, who had no land base, were effectively excluded from
the preference, and the preference for existing users forced the poorest cattlemen into
bankruptcy.334 The antimonopoly potential of the Act was also thwarted by the fact that—although
not conveying a property right—grazing permits are preferentially renewed at the end of each
term.335 That potential was further curtailed when the Tenth Circuit decided that conservation-use
permits were antithetical to its language.336 Despite its mixed antimonopolistic effects, the Taylor
Act and its implementation ended the disposition era of public land policy, preserving the
remaining public domain for public allocation through regulation, not private appropriation.
VI. ANTIMONOPOLY IN MODERN PUBLIC LAND STATUTES
In the modern era, the antimonopoly theme persists in public land law, enshrined in federal
policies promoting widespread use by diverse users, limiting dominant uses, requiring advanced
public planning, and upholding user access to reserved lands. Laws promulgating these policies
include the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (“MUSYA”), 337 Federal Land Policy and
cattlemen, to the exclusion of other users, such as nomadic sheepherders, which limited the antimonopoly effect. See
id. at 48–49.
329
This monopoly had been defended fiercely in so-called range wars between established ranching interests and
competing users such as homesteaders and sheepherders. WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 85–86.
330
Grazing Service personnel “went out and practically turned the lands over to the big cowmen and the big
sheepmen of the West.” Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 319, at 64 (referencing the remarks of Chairman
Johnson in the Hearings on the Interior Department Appropriations Bill for 1947 before the House Subcomm. on
Appropriations, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1946)).
331
See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 319, at 49 (discussing the contradictory nature of the Taylor
Grazing Act, in that “Congress carefully emphasized that a permit to graze was in no sense a vested right, yet at the
same time it ensured that adjacent landowners would be able to develop a monopoly on the grazing benefits
bestowed.”).
332
Ch. 865 § 3, 48 Stat. at 1271.
333
The regulations created the following preference system: first, to owners of stock who owned “base property” (in
land or water) and who grazed their herds during the five years prior to the enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act;
second, to other owners of base property who lacked prior use; and third, to those who did not own base property.
See Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 734–35 (2000) (citing Rules for Administration of Grazing
Districts (June 14, 1937)).
334
Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 319, at 56.
335
See Huber, supra note 12, at 1005.
336
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287, 1307 (10th Cir. 1999), aff’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 728
(2000). The government did not appeal to the Supreme Court the Tenth Circuit’s rejection of the conservation
permit issue, which was the only issue on which the challengers to Secretary Babbitt’s rangeland reforms prevailed.
337
16 U.S.C. §§ 528–31.
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Management Act (“FLPMA”),338 National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”),339 and the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”).340
A.

MULTIPLE USE

In 1960 the MUSYA codified multiple use on national forests, although foresters had practiced
multiple use for decades since Pinchot’s day. 341 The statute was a response to growing public
concern over clearcutting, overharvesting, and increasing recreational use, as well as
countervailing pressures from the industry to ratchet up the harvest.342 Clear-cutting,343 “highgrading,”344 and failure to re-seed harvested areas were common logging practices. These practices
not only were environmentally detrimental, they were highly visible to a public that had begun to
value recreation on public lands.345 In the World War II and post-war eras, commercial uses on
national forests began to increasingly conflict with non-consumptive and recreational uses.346
The Forest Service requested legislation expressly authorizing the balancing of these
competing uses, which it was, in fact, already doing and had done so since the days of Pinchot.347
Congress responded by enacting MUSYA in 1960, establishing five major national forest uses:
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife.348 The Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) lands acquired this directive temporarily in 1964349 and permanently in 1976 with the
enactment of FLPMA, BLM’s organic statute.350 FLPMA included a comparatively broader range
338

43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–82.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–14.
340
Codified in part at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233.
341
See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
342
See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 11, at 29. During World War II, the annual harvest of timber from the
national forests more than tripled, rising from an average of 1 billion board feet to 3.3 billion board feet in 1944. See
WILKINSON, supra note 143, at 135. The booming post-war economy and population growth required timber for
homebuilding and manufacturing, raising annual extraction to 4.4 billion board feet in 1952. Id. at 136.
343
See W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 954–55 (4th Cir. 1975) (describing the
effect that World War II and the postwar building boom had on the management practices of the Forest Service,
changing it “from a custodian to a production agency. It was in this new role that the Service initiated the policy of
even-aged management in the national forests . . .”). Even-aged management is a euphemism for clear-cutting.
344
That is, a method of removing timber which removed only the most valuable trees, without re-seeding a renewal
crop. See WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 136.
345
See id. at 137.
346
See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 11, at 9 (describing by region the challenges for national forest
management: coal leasing in Montana, Wyoming, and Utah; oil and gas development competing with recreation
from Montana to Wyoming and from Colorado to Arizona; commercial timber harvest conflicting with salmon and
steelhead in the Pacific Northwest; and issues of large predator habitat protection in the Northern Rockies).
347
See id. at 28-29 (“Forest Service planners responded to the increasing demands [from loggers and recreationists]
by attempting to coordinate resource planning. After preparing an inventory of resources, local managers developed
composite plans that identified recreation and special management areas, watercourses, transportation routes, and
other characteristics.”).
348
Pub. L. 86-517, § 1, June 12, 1960, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 528; the uses are listed in alphabetical order, but
notice that “recreation” was listed as “outdoor recreation” so that it could be mentioned before “range,” emphasizing
that the commodity uses are not to dominate management. See George Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and
Vacuous Platitudes: The Meaning of “Multiple Use Sustained Yield” for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L.
REV. 229, 252 (1982).
349
Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411–18 (a temporary statute that expired in 1970).
350
43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
339

39

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662313

of uses for the agency to co-manage, including recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed,
wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific, and historical values.351
The idea of “multiple use” was an outgrowth of Pinchot’s utilitarian approach to public lands
management, expressed as resource allocation for the greatest good for the greatest number over
the long run.352 MUSYA required the Forest Service to give “due consideration” to the relative
values of the various resources.353 The statute defines “multiple use” as:
The management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national forest so that
they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people;
making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related
services . . . ; that some land will be used for less than all of the resources; and harmonious
and coordinated management of the various resources, each with the other, without
impairment of the productivity of the land, with consideration being given to the relative
values of the various resources, and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give
the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output.354
The statute’s antimonopoly principle is clear: no single use should dominate the management
scheme. Land managers must consider several uses and provide for them in an integrated fashion
and in a manner that avoids “impairment to the productivity of the land.” Congress also stressed
that commodification and extraction to produce the highest economic output would no longer be
guiding principles in land management.
However, MUSYA amounted to little more than a statement of policy.355 Its antimonopoly
tenets contained no measurable standards or enforceable provisions. For example, the Forest
Service arguably ignored the directive of MUSYA in selling 8.7 billion board feet of old growth
in the Tongass National Forest in 1968.356 The sale included ninety-five percent of the commercial
forestlands available in the Tongass, the nation’s largest national forest. 357 In Sierra Club v.
Hardin, environmentalists unsuccessfully challenged the sale, arguing that the Tongass was being
administered predominantly for the purpose of timber production in violation of MUSYA.358 The
district court was unable to find any useful law to apply, stating that, “Congress has given no
indication as to the weight to be assigned each value and it must be assumed that the decision as
to the proper mix of uses within any particular area is left to the sound discretion and expertise of
the Forest Service.”359 The court interpreted the statutory phrase “due consideration” of multiple
uses to require only “some consideration,” with judicial deference to the agency’s decision.360
Id. § 1702(c). See Coggins, supra note 348, at 269–70. Compared to MUSYA, the BLM’s directive in FLPMA
includes more “preservation” uses but also mineral production as well. See id.
352
See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, at § 30:1.
353
16 U.S.C. § 529.
354
Id. § 531.
355
See ARNOLD BOLLE, A UNIVERSITY VIEW OF THE FOREST SERVICE, S. DOC. NO. 115 (1970) (criticizing the Forest
Service for failing to promote true multiple use management and continuing a “dominant use” focus on timber
production).
356
Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 104 (D. Alaska 1971), rev’d, Sierra Club v.
Butz, 3 E.L.R. 20292 (9th Cir. 1973).
357
See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 11, at 72. The Act did not address whether the Forest Service could use
all of the commercially harvestable area for harvesting, and leave other parts of the forest for the other uses to fulfill
its multiple use mandate.
358
325 F. Supp. at 106.
359
Id. at 123.
360
Id. at 123 n.48.
351
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The Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, ruling that the district court should have considered
a suppressed analytical report on the sale to determine whether the agency’s decision was an
informed one.361 However, the appellate court did accept the district court’s “some consideration”
standard interpreting MUSYA,362 deciding the Act merely requires the Forest Service to consider
all the various uses, not administer them equally.363 Thus, the environmentalists could not truly
rely on MUSYA to challenge the timber-use monopoly in the Tongass.
The timber dominance of the Forest Service was instead overcome by removing lands from
the agency’s apparently standardless multiple-use balancing. 364 During the 1960s, Congress
reacted to the recommendations of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, which
urged legislative designation of federal lands for non-commodity use, by separating these areas
from the timber harvest-focused view of the Forest Service.365 Congress responded by enacting a
wilderness system, 366 a national trails system, 367 and a wild and scenic rivers system, 368 all
designed to preserve natural landscapes, accommodate recreation, and protect the free-flowing and
unpolluted character of designated rivers. These systems protect non-commodity uses by
geographically confining the broad discretion that the land agencies previously enjoyed.
For the lands that Congress did not remove from the Forest Service’s MUSYA balancing, the

361

3 E.L.R. 20292 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id. However, the court did state that “due consideration” required the agency to take “the values in question . . .
informedly and rationally. . . into balance. The requirement can hardly be satisfied by a showing of knowledge of the
consequences and a decision to ignore them.” Id.
363
See, e.g., Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979), in which the court described MUSYA’s
standards as “contain[ing] the most general clauses and phrases . . . [which] can hardly be considered concrete limits
upon agency discretion. Rather it is language with ‘breathe[s] discretion at every pore.’”
364
See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why Multiple-Use Failed, 18 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 422-23 (1994) (explaining that Congress has “acted to curtail the excesses of multiple use”—
produced by agency capture by commodity users—by reducing the land base subject to multiple use principles). The
land base reduction was accomplished by establishing a dominant non-commodity use for those areas). Wilderness
designation represents an “enclave” approach, in that it protects non-commodity uses by separating them from
disposal and exploitation policies. See John D. Leshy, Legal Wilderness: Its Past and Some Speculations on Its
Future, 44 ENVTL. L. 549, 569 (2014).
365
See OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMM’N, OUTDOOR RECREATION FOR AMERICA, A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS (1962), http://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/anps/anps_5d.htm.
Congress established the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission in 1958 in order to determine the
present and future recreational wants and needs of the public, and to make recommendations to Congress as to the
policies and programs it should implement to meet those needs. Id.
366
Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-577, Sept. 3, 1964, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136. Congressional
designation of wilderness areas was thought necessary because the Forest Service had the power (and exercised the
power) to remove wild land protections from administratively designated wilderness. See WILKINSON, supra note
151, at 139. The impetus for the creation of a wilderness bill came from public opposition to conventional
development, damming, and road building in wild places. Leshy, supra note 364, at 561–66. The Wilderness
Society, initiated in 1935 by Aldo Leopold (who had invented and pushed for “primitive” designations as a Forest
Service employee) and Bob Marshall (who thereafter became the head of recreation management for the Forest
Service), called for the designation of wild acreage for the purpose of protecting it from growing development. Id. at
556. Decades later, in 1956, conservationists succeeded in convincing Congress to reject the construction of Echo
Park Dam in Dinosaur National Monument. Id. at 562. According to John Leshy, this rejection sparked a national
debate about the creation of a wilderness preservation system. Id. at 561–63.
367
National Trails System Act, Pub. L. 90-543, Oct. 2, 1968, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241–1249.
368
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. 90-542, Oct. 2, 1968, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287.
362
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national forest system continued to be plagued by poorly planned and even-aged management.369
In effect, clearcutting is a use-monopoly, in that it deprives an area of almost all the other
contemplated uses (habitat for tree-dwelling species, recreation, watershed protection, and so
forth). In many cases, clearcutting can adversely affect the diversity of uses, species, and habitat
in surrounding areas.370 In the early 1970s, environmentalists challenged clearcutting as a violation
of the 1897 Organic Act, which permitted the Forest Service to sell only individually marked or
designated dead, matured, or large growth trees.371 In W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am.
v. Butz, the district court agreed that the Forest Service’s proposed clearcut timber sales in the
Monongahela National Forest violated the statute.372 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, determining that
the language of the statute was clear and supported by a legislative history showing Congress’s
intent that young and growing trees be left standing for the purpose of preserving the forests.373
This judicial ban on clearcutting was short-lived, however: following the 1975 Monongahela
decision, Congress enacted the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) of 1976, which
expressly authorized clearcutting under certain conditions.374
B.

LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING UNDER NFMA AND FLPMA

Despite NFMA’s authorization of monopolistic clearcutting, two provisions of the statute
reflect prominent antimonopoly principles: (1) the Act’s limitations on clearcutting and (2) its
overarching resource planning requirement. NFMA and its harvesting provisions expressly
incorporate the multiple-use policy of MUSYA, allowing clearcutting only in circumscribed
situations.375
Under the statute, the Forest Service may not choose a harvesting method based upon the
greatest dollar return.376 If the agency chooses the clearcutting option, it must be the optimum
harvest method,377 after interdisciplinary review to assess the potential environmental, biological,
aesthetic, engineering, and economic effects of each sale, as well as the sale’s consistency with the
applicable land plan. 378 Clearcuts must also be carried out in “a manner consistent with the
protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, and aesthetic resources, and the
regeneration of the timber resource.”379 The upshot of these conditions is that the Forest Service
369

See Coggins, supra note 348, at 276. Indeed, the Wilderness Act hardly had any immediate effect on the scale of
timber cutting on the national forests because much of the initially designated wilderness was above the timber line.
WILKINSON, supra note 151, at 139. The Act initially only protected about nine million acres of national forest
lands. Leshy, supra note 364, at 566.
370
For example, clearcutting mixed Eastern hardwood forests resulted in conversion to pine stands. See GEORGE C.
COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS AND RESOURCES LAW 692 (6th ed. 2007).
371
16 U.S.C. § 476, repealed Pub. L. 94-588 § 13, Oct. 22, 1976.
372
367 F. Supp. 422 (N.D.W. Va. 1973).
373
522 F.2d 945, 952 (4th Cir. 1975).
374
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(F).
375
NFMA aimed in part to end the paradigm of timber as a use-monopoly. According to Senator Hubert Humphrey,
a principal sponsor of NFMA, “The days have ended when the forest may be viewed only as trees and trees viewed
only as timber. The soil and the water, the grasses and the shrubs, the fish and the wildlife, and the beauty that is the
forest must become integral parts of resource managers’ thinking and actions.” 122 CONG. REC. 5619 (daily ed. Mar.
5, 1976) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey).
376
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iv).
377
Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i).
378
Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(ii).
379
Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(v).
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must justify its decisions with findings according to these factors in a record subject to public
review and comment.380
Forest planning for multiple uses 381 reflects three major tenets of antimonopoly: (1)
accommodation of diverse uses; (2) development of a framework for balancing those uses before
the agency must evaluate specific resource proposals; and (3) accountability for resource
allocation. Both NFMA382 and FLPMA383 require land managers to prepare land plans reflecting
the multiple use and sustained yield standards.384
National forest planning requirements include some unique elements that embody an ethic of
antimonopoly, particularly requirements concerning plant and wildlife diversity and sustainability,
with the latter including an ecosystem integrity requirement. NFMA requires Forest Service land
plans to provide for diversity of plant and animal communities in order to meet overall multipleuse objectives.385 Under regulations promulgated in 2012, Forest Service plans must contribute to
the recovery of federally listed threatened and endangered species under the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”), must conserve proposed and candidate ESA species, and must maintain a viable
population of each species of conservation concern386 within the plan area.387 In theory,388 this
provision requires the Forest Service to ensure that non-commodity uses are represented,
protected, measured, and monitored.389
The 2012 regulations also require Forest Service plans to provide for social, economic, and
See 36 C.F.R. § 219.15(d) (2012) (“A project or activity approval document must describe how the project or
activity is consistent with applicable plan components . . . .”); id. § 219.11(d)(5) (2013) (requiring that plans limit
harvest such that “[t]imber will be harvested from NFS lands only where such harvest would comply with the
resource protections set out in sections 6(g)(3)(E) and (F) of the NFMA (16 U.S.C. 1604(g)(3)(E) and (F).”)).
381
Multiple-use planning has not lived up to its promise. See Blumm, supra note 364, at 421 (explaining that
multiple use failed to produce balanced results because commodity-based interest groups pressure land managers to
maintain historic levels of grazing and timber harvesting in low-visibility administrative decisions). Consider also
that the Forest and Rangelands Renewable Planning Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1610, requires the federal
government to set a timber production goal for the national forests. Id. § 1602. After Congress passed the 1974 Act,
board-feet goals became a driving force shaping the content of NFMA-mandated forest plans. See Blumm, supra
note 364, at 427.
382
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
383
43 U.S.C. § 1712(a).
384
16 U.S.C. § 1604(e); 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1). FLPMA’s planning requirement encompasses nine general criteria,
all of which are aimed at ensuring administrative consideration of diverse values to produce a balanced plan,
including (1) designation and protection of areas of “critical environmental concern,” (2) evaluation of present and
potential uses of public lands, (3) consideration of the relative scarcity of values involved and the alternative means
and siting for those uses, and (4) weighing long-term and short-term benefits to the public.
385
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B); 36 C.F.R. § 219.9 (2012).
386
A species of conservation concern “is a species, other than federally recognized threatened, endangered,
proposed, or candidate species, that is known to occur in the plan area and for which the regional forester has
determined that the best available scientific information indicates substantial concern about the species’ capability to
persist over the long-term in the plan area.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.9(c).
387
36 C.F.R. § 219.9(b).
388
The effect of the diversity rule was weakened by giving the regional forester discretion to select species of
conservation concern, id. (c); she also has the option of determining that maintaining a species is beyond the
agency’s authority. Id. (b)(2). The regulations dropped a requirement of the 1982 regulations requiring the Forest
Service to maintain “viable populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning
area.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982). See Courtney Schultz et al., Wildlife Conservation Planning Under the United
States Forest Service’s 2012 Planning Rule, 77 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 428, 432 (2012).
389
36 C.F.R. § 219.12(a)(5)(iii)–(iv). Focal species and ecological conditions are proxies for actual monitoring of
species of conservation concern.
380
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ecological sustainability.390 Although “sustainability” is not a use, the concept acknowledges that
forest resources must be shared inter-generationally to protect future use. 391 Within the
sustainability directive is a requirement to plan for ecosystem integrity. 392 The regulations direct
the Forest Service to look beyond the borders of the plan area to account for existing conditions in
the adjacent landscape and the changing climate.393 Thus, the regulations recognize that patchwork
harvests and developments affect wildlife’s ability to access and use the landscape as a whole.
Although a court once upheld the Forest Service’s rejection of a conservation-biology approach to
management,394 the planning rules now recognize the agency’s duty to “restore structure, function,
composition, and connectivity” for purposes of ecological sustainability.395 Thus, the regulations
suggest a form of antimonopoly of human use, infusing forest planning with requirements based
on the needs of the greater biological community.396 However, given the history of deferential case
law favoring the Forest Service,397 whether the public may enforce the interspecies antimonopoly
aspect of the forest planning rules is not yet clear.398
C.

PRIORITIZING SUBSISTENCE USES IN ALASKA

390

36 C.F.R. § 219.8.
The regulations’ definition of “sustainability” includes “the capability to meet the needs of the present generation
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.19.
392
Id. § 219.19(a)(1).
393
36 C.F.R. § 219.8(a)(1).
394
Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Forest Service’s refusal to incorporate
principles of conservation biology—e.g., consideration of edge effects, island biogeography, and connectivity—in
its plan for the Nicolet and Chiquamegon National Forests).
395
36 C.F.R. § 219.8(a).
396
Opponents of the rule claimed that the 2012 sustainability planning rule: (1) “establishes achievement of
‘ecological sustainability’ [as] the primary purpose of every national forest,” while “relegating ‘social and economic
sustainability’ to an inferior and insignificant position,” in violation of the Organic Act, NFMA, MUSYA; (2)
unlawfully elevates species viability, conservation, and recovery over the Forest Service’s statutory multiple use
objectives; and (3) improperly imposes the requirement of “best available scientific information” in the development
of forest plans. Complaint ¶¶ 25, 27, 29, 32, 48, 52, Federal Forest Resource Coalition v. Vilsack, No. 1:12-cv-1333
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 13, 2012). The D.C. District Court dismissed the Federal Forest Resource Coalition’s case for
lack of standing in March 2015. No. 1:12-cv-1333 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2015); No. 1:12-cv-1333 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2015) (memorandum opinion explaining that the plaintiffs lacked standing). Plaintiffs have since filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied in May. No. 1:12-cv-1333 (D.D.C. May 27, 2015).
397
See, e.g., Lands Council v. Martin, 529 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2008) (deferring to a Forest Service plan
amendment interpreting the term “live trees” to exclude certain trees that are still scientifically alive, and finding “no
legal requirement that a methodology be ‘peer-reviewed or published in a credible source.’”); Lands Council v.
McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (taking a hands-off approach in determining that the Forest
Service’s scientific methodology need not be confirmed through on-the-ground analysis). But see Karuk Tribe v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that, based on the record, mining proposals
under the Forest Service’s jurisdiction “may affect” the local listed salmon, and therefore the Forest Service violated
the Endangered Species Act by failing to consult).
398
For example, under the prior planning rule, many plans lacked enforceable standards and clear conservation
commitments for sensitive species, to the point that the plans’ inadequacies influenced Fish & Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) decisions to list some species under the Endangered Species Act. See Schultz et al., supra note 388, at 440
(explaining that, for example, the FWS based its decision to list the Canada lynx in part on the fact that most
national forests with lynx had no population viability objectives or management standards for the lynx).
391
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Antimonopoly sentiment is also evident in ANILCA’s subsistence provisions. 399 These
provisions were included in a statute that created vast expanses of conservation reserves, 400
recognized wildlife protection; preserved scenic areas and protected subsistence harvest for rural
residents.401 The most explicit antimonopoly principle embedded in the statute is the recognition
and protection of subsistence uses of public resources. The statute defined “subsistence” as:
[T]he customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of wild, renewable
resources for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing,
tools, or transportation; for the making and selling of handicraft articles out of
nonedible byproducts of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family
consumption; for barter, or sharing for personal or family consumption; and for
customary trade.402
Section 804 created a preference for these subsistence uses of the fish and wildlife resource.403 The
effect is that when the government limits hunting and fishing to protect the resource, ANILCA
gives subsistence harvesters priority over commercial and recreational harvesters.404
Section 810 requires any federal agency planning a project on public land to assess the effects
of the project on subsistence and study how adverse effects may be avoided.405 Section 810 reflects
antimonopoly sentiment by giving subsistence uses some procedural protection against other
public land uses that threaten to reduce subsistence harvests.406 However, case law interpreting
Section 810 has not imposed meaningful restrictions on uses harming subsistence harvests, such
as timber sales.407
D.

ENSURING PUBLIC ACCESS

399

ANILCA represented the greatest conservation achievement in terms of acreage in the Twentieth century. It
doubled the size of the National Park System, tripled the acreage of the National Wildlife Refuge System, and
quadrupled the size of the Wilderness Preservation System. COGGINS ET AL., supra note 370, at 29.
400
ANILCA added 103 million acres of BLM land to federal conservation systems. See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 183, § 14:23. Included were millions of acres of new national parks, wildlife refuges, wilderness areas,
and wild and scenic rivers. See id. § 2.17.
401
16 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012).
402
16 U.S.C. § 3113.
403
Id. § 3114.
404
Id.
405
16 U.S.C § 3120. Section 810 requires federal agencies to undertake a two-tiered analysis of the effects of federal
projects on subsistence activities. First, the agency must evaluate the effect of a project on subsistence use and
investigate whether there might be project alternatives or alternative sites that would protect subsistence uses. Id. §
3120(a). Second, if the proposed project would “significantly restrict” subsistence uses, id., the agency must
undertake further study to determine (1) whether such significant restriction is necessary, (2) whether the project
uses the smallest amount of land necessary to accomplish the task, and (3) how the agency will take reasonable steps
to minimize the adverse impacts on subsistence uses. Id. An activity which would significantly restrict subsistence
uses may not proceed unless those determinations are made. Id.
406
Although the word “subsistence” may suggest an ascetic way of living, the statutory protection includes
commodity uses, a wide range of products, and foodstuffs that support Alaska Native cultures. See Dan Cheyette,
Breaking the Trail of Broken Promises: “Necessary” in Section 810 of ANILCA Carries Substantive Obligations, 27
ENVTL. L. 611, 619 (1999).
407
See Joris Naiman, ANILCA Section 810: An Undervalued Protection for Alaskan Villagers’ Subsistence, 7
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 211, 285–87 (1996) (discussing the case law, especially Hoonan Indian Ass’n v. Morrison,
170 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 1990), which interpreted the statutory language of “minimum amount of public lands
necessary” to mean the amount of land necessary to conduct a timber sale, not a substantive limit on the size of the
sale).
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This article’s earlier discussion of the Unlawful Inclosures Act shows that access to federal
public lands and resources has been a major antimonopoly theme for well over a century.408 In the
modern era, although federal land managers have restricted and prohibited the manner and means
of access,409 multiple policies continue to safeguard public access to and across public lands. This
part considers two modern aspects of antimonopoly through access: the public’s recreational
license to use national forest lands and FLPMA’s recognition of existing public highways as access
routes.
1. The Public’s Recreational License
The public has an implied license to use public lands for purposes of recreation. The leading
case is United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., in which the Ninth Circuit upheld federal
recognition of a public recreational license under the Surface Resources Act of 1955 to unpatented
mining claims on public lands. 410 The court enjoined an alleged miner from excluding
recreationalists on 203 mining claims covering approximately thirteen square miles on BLM and
Forest Service land. 411 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the 1955 Surface Resources Act
specifically preserved the right of the federal government and its permittees and licensees to use
the surface resources of unpatented mining claims and to cross mining claims to access other
lands. 412 Congress enacted the 1955 statute for the antimonopoly purpose of preventing
fraudulently located mining claims from gaining exclusive possession of the surface for endeavors
like private fishing and hunting activities.413
Upholding a broadly implied public license to access and use the public lands,414 the court
408

See supra notes 217–30 and accompanying text.
For example, in the last century, the implied access license to graze on the public domain has been revoked by
the Taylor Grazing Act and replaced with a permit system. See supra notes 316–21 and accompanying text. A
statute granting rights-of-way for the construction of highways over public lands, known as Revised Statute 2477,
was repealed by FLPMA in 1976. See infra notes 412–13 and accompanying text; COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 183, § 15:19. Access through national forest lands has a long history of regulatory oversight and restriction.
The Organic Act expressly made public access subservient to the rules and regulations covering such national
forests. 16 U.S.C. § 448. See also Pub. Lands for the People, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 697 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th
Cir. 2012) (describing the Forest Service’s authority to restrict motor vehicle access in the El Dorado National
Forest, even where such restriction would burden access to mining claims in the forest). Additionally, the
Wilderness Act prohibits road-building and motorized access in wilderness areas, although the Act does contain
access provisions (including exceptions for area administration and special provisions grandfathering in some
existing access such as aircraft or motorboats as well as valid mining claims existing before 1984). 16 U.S.C. §
1133(c)–(d). Access is and has long been subject to considerable time, place, purpose, and manner regulations.
410
611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980); See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, § 31:2.
411
Curtiss-Nevada, 611 F.2d at 1279.
412
30 U.S.C. § 612(b).
413
Curtiss-Nevada, 611 F.2d at 1281–82 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 84–730, at 6 (1955): “Mining locations made under
existing law may, and do, whether by accident or design, frequently block access: to water needed in grazing use of
the national forests or other public lands; to valuable recreational areas; to agents of the Federal Government
desiring to reach adjacent lands for purposes of managing wild-game habitat or improving fishing streams so as to
thwart the public harvest and proper management of fish and game resources on the public lands generally, both on
the located lands and on adjacent lands.”).
414
Curtiss-Nevada, 611 F.2d at 1286. The district court had ruled that use and access is available only to those
members of the public who hold individual recreation licenses or permits from a state or federal agency. United
States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 1373 (E.D. Cal. 1976).
409
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recognized that the federal government, as “trustee” of the lands,415 had long allowed the use of
public lands for recreational purposes or to afford access adjoining lands, so long as the
government did not revoke its tacit consent. 416 The court decided that the 1955 Act aimed to
promote public use of public lands by recognizing an implied public license absent a conflict with
mining operations.417 The alleged miner therefore could not use its alleged mining claim to impose
a monopoly use on the public lands.418
2. R.S. 2477 Highway Rights-of-Way
In 1976, FLPMA declared that a claimant wishing to establish a new right-of-way across BLM
land or national forests for commercial or non-casual purposes needed to obtain agency approval
to create the right-of-way.419 However, the statute grandfathered valid existing rights-of-way that
predated its enactment.420 A provision of the 1866 Mining Act, known as Revised Statute 2477
(“R.S. 2477”), granted rights-of-way for the “construction” of “highways” over public lands.421
To claim an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, one must show that the public used the route as a highway
before the 1976 enactment of FLPMA, that the right-of-way vested before the government
reserved the land for a public purpose, and that the right-of-way was not abandoned.422
R.S. 2477 fosters a form of antimonopoly by allowing the public to enforce historic public-

415

Curtiss-Nevada, 611 F.2d at 1283.
Id. at 1283–84 (citing Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); and
McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922)).
417
Id. at 1282, 1285.
418
The 1872 Mining Law contained several antimonopoly provisions that, for example, limit the size of claims and
require labor to maintain a mine claim. 30 U.S.C. §§ 23 (size limits), 28 (required labor). Implementation of the
Mining Law proved problematic due to frequent fraudulent claims seeking title to lands where there was no mineral
value. In response, the Interior Department interpreted the law to require that “valuable mineral” (required to
support a “discovery” necessary for a valid mine claim) satisfy a “marketability test” (meaning that the mineral
could be “extracted, removed, and marketed at a profit.”) The Supreme Court upheld the use of this test as a
reasonable means of reducing fraudulent claims in United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968). A district court
upheld Interior’s authority to reject mine plans that cause “undue” environmental degradation as a reasonable
interpretation of section 302(b) of FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. §1732(b), in Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d
30 (D.D.C. 2003). Both judicial interpretations foster antimonopoly by giving the agency the ability to reject and
regulate federal mining operations where they are inconsistent with multiple use goals.
419
43 U.S.C. § 1761.
420
43 U.S.C. § 1769(a) (2012) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall have the effect of terminating any right-of-way or
right-of-use heretofore issued, granted, or permitted”). See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, § 15:18.
421
Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253; see S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 740
(10th Cir. 2005).
422
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, § 15:18. Who has the burden of showing whether R.S. 2477 rights exist
may depend on who brings the suit, and in what circuit the case is brought. The Tenth Circuit’s decision in The
Wilderness Society v. Kane County seems to have placed a burden on environmental plaintiffs to show that counties
claiming R.S. 2477 rights do not actually have valid claims, rather than presuming federal ownership and placing the
burden on the counties to first quiet title in court. Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cty., 632 F.3d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir.
2011) (denying standing to environmental plaintiffs because their claims required validation of the federal
government’s property rights, thus the environmental plaintiffs were inappropriately seeking to vindicate the rights
of a third party—the federal government). See Hillary M. Hoffman, Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: The Wilderness
Society v. Kane County Leaves Everyone Confused About Navigating A Right-of-Way Claim Under Revised Statute
2477, 18 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 3, 30 (2012).
416
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access rights against the federal government.423 In Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, the
Tenth Circuit, in a majority opinion by Judge McConnell, decided that establishing an R.S. 2477
highway requires proof of a continuous history of public use before 1976, but does not require a
showing of mechanical construction. 424 In rejecting a mechanical construction requirement
favored by the federal government and environmentalists, the court suggested that the probable
intent of Congress was “to ensure that widely used routes would remain open to the public even
after homesteaders or other land claimants obtained title to the land over which the public
traveled,” not to encourage individuals to invest in road infrastructure. 425 Therefore, what is
important for a valid existing right under R.S. 2477 is a history of consistent public use before
1976 by which the public effectively accepted the federal offer of a right-of-way.426 The claimant
must also show that the claimed road still exists in that location.427
The court’s interpretation of R.S. 2477 to include de facto public travel routes thus recognized
a broader range of historic access routes than had the BLM.428 R.S. 2477 highways, as preserved
by FLPMA, serve an antimonopoly purpose by protecting established and continuously used
public access ways, defined in terms of their historic and ongoing utility to the public without
being closed to access by the BLM or other agencies such as the National Park Service.429 In fact,
R.S. 2477 highways may burden private lands as well.430 In 2011, the state of Utah filed claims to

423

Environmental groups assert that local governments filing R.S. 2477 claims are motivated by the desire to regain
local control and thwart wilderness designations by the federal government. See Robert L. Glicksman, Wilderness
Management by the Multiple Use Agencies: What Makes the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
Different?, 44 ENVTL. L. 447, 473 (2014).
424
425 F.3d 735, 769, 782–83 (10th Cir. 2005). The district court had decided in favor of BLM, which rejected
several R.S. 2477 claims of Utah counties’ because BLM’s administrative decision was based on substantial
evidence on the record, agreeing with BLM’s interpretation that valid R.S. 2477 claims required visible and
purposeful physical construction. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137, 1143 (D. Utah 2001).
425
SUWA, 425 F.3d at 780. Instead, according to the court, “construction” meant something more like clearing
boulders and brush so that wagons could travel through the area. Id. There is little indication in the legislative record
as to the intent of Congress in enacting R.S. 2477, so intent is left largely to the judicial imagination.
426
Id. at 769. The federal offer was made in ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. at 253 (1866) (“[t]he right of way for the
construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.”) repealed by Pub. L.
No. 94–579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (1976). What constitutes acceptance varies according to the law of each
state, which the federal government “borrows” due to a lack of federal highway law. Most western states do not
require an overt government act to accept the federal right-of-way offer, as continuous public use will suffice. 425
F.3d at 770–71. The period of proof of continuous use varies state-by-state, since the federal rule was “borrowed”
from state law. Id. at 771. In Utah, a public right-of-way requires use “by many and different persons for a variety of
purposes” and is “open to all who desired to use it. . . .” Id. at 772 (quoting Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v.
Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah 1929)). The Tenth Circuit noted that this state interpretation was consistent with the
traditional definition of “highway” as “a way over which the public at large have a right of passage.” Id. at 782
(quoting ISAAC GRANT THOMPSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS 1 (1868)).
427
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 183, § 15:18; Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254, 1258 (9th Cir. 1993).
428
SUWA, 425 F.3d at 781 (“If a particular route sustained substantial use by the general public over the necessary
period of time, one of two things must be true: either no mechanical construction was necessary, or any necessary
construction must have taken place.”).
429
Occasional or desultory use is not sufficient. Id. at 771. The absence of an existing right of way does not prevent
individuals from gaining access to the public lands for private or commercial uses, but that would require a right-ofway permit under Title V of FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. § 1761.
430
See Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648–49 (Utah 1929) (deciding that an R.S. 2477
public highway existed across grazing lands before they came into the private ownership of the plaintiff and,
therefore, defendants could continue to use it as a public highway).
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over 18,000 such alleged highways, 431 as part of an effort to disqualify lands with wilderness
qualities from wilderness designation, since the Wilderness Act has been interpreted to forbid
permanent roads in wilderness areas.432 The vast majority of these claims remain unresolved as of
this writing.
3. Sacred Sites
One of the more surprising results of antimonopoly sentiment in modern public land law
concerns Native American sacred sites on federal lands. Indian tribes ceded many of these sites in
treaties and treaty substitutes, but they maintain that federal land managers should manage the sites
to maintain tribes’ access to them for religious and cultural activities. The leading case was Lyng
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,433 in which the Forest Service decided to build a
timber road in a sacred area despite an agency-commissioned study that concluded that the road
would produce “serious and irreparable damage” to Indian religious practices.434 The Supreme
Court reversed lower court decisions enjoining the project435 and ruled that the Forest Service
could proceed to build a timber road in a sacred area despite objections by Native Americans that
the road violated their constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Court rejected their claims on the pathbreaking ground that non-discriminatory public land
decisions do not require a compelling justification if they only have an “incidental effect” on native
religious practices without prohibiting those practices.436
The Court’s underlying reasoning reflected antimonopoly sentiment. Justice O’Connor’s
majority opinion emphasized that requiring the Forest Service to protect Indian religious practices
would be tantamount to imposing a religious servitude on public lands, effectively giving them a
veto over public land management.437 The decision suggested that upholding the lower courts’
431

See Sierra Club, RS 2477 Claims and Lawsuit, UTAH SIERRAN, https://utah.sierraclub.org/content/rs-2477-claimsand-lawsuit (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
432
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)(3) (“Except as specifically provided for in this Act, and subject to existing private rights,
there shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this Act.”).
Note that R.S. 2477 rights-of-way could be considered “existing private rights” that wilderness areas must
accommodate. And while wilderness study areas (“WSAs”) and designated wilderness areas may not have
permanent “roads,” they may still be designated as such, even where they have R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. A “road”
for purposes of the Wilderness Act is different from a public road for R.S. 2477 purposes. An R.S. 2477 right-ofway may exist within a WSA. See Kane Cty. v. United States, 772 F.3d 1205, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014). In those
situations, the WSA/wilderness designation “is subject to the terms and conditions of the pre-existing [right of way]
grant.” Id. (citing BLM Instructional Memorandum No. 90–589 (Aug. 15, 1990)). Also, the Wilderness Act is
sometimes thought to require at least 5,000 contiguous roadless acres, but the statute requires the area to be 5,000
acres or be “of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1131(c).
433
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
434
See id. at 442. See also id. at 451 (“The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the
logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious
practices.”).
435
See id. at 458.
436
Id. at 450–51 (“This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which may make
it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to
their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification for otherwise lawful
actions.”).
437
Id. at 452 (“The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over
public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion.”).
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injunction would be tantamount to recognizing “de facto beneficial ownership of some rather
spacious tracts of public property,” providing what amounted to a “concomitant subsidy of the
Indian religion.”438 In short, the antimonopoly paradigm of multiple use of public lands trumped
the protection of Native American religious practices,439 an outcome that would not surprise tribal
advocates.440
VII.

CONCLUSION

Antimonopoly principles have thoroughly infused federal public land law. They have been
present since the founding of the United States. Somewhat surprisingly, antimonopoly principles
have recently come under sustained attack in Congress, 441 despite the fact that congressional
antimonopoly policy may be the most persistent theme in the long history of federal public land
law. Reversal of such longstanding sentiment would be shocking, however, conflicting with a
deeply held view that public lands should be managed for the many, not for the monopolistic few.
Historically, antimonopoly sentiment concerning public lands reflected a philosophy of (1)
providing widespread distribution of the public domain; (2) preserving public access to public
resources; and (3) preventing concentration of public resources in the hands of the few. Over the
years, the diversity of authorized public land uses grew from promoting commodity production in
the nineteenth century to emphasizing non-commodity uses in the twentieth century. Today,
antimonopoly policy not only includes distributional equity in the allocation of resources but also
438

Id. at 453.
However, the proposed forest road and the associated timbering harvest never actually occurred. The Supreme
Court’s opinion did not reach two statutory grounds for the lower court’s injunction concerning violations of the
National Environmental Policy and Clean Water Acts. Before the agency could remedy those defects, Congress
included the area in the Smith River National Recreation Act and designated the area as wilderness, 16 U.S.C. §§
460bbb-3(b)(2)(H). See JUDITH V. ROYSTER ET AL., NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 19 (3d ed.
2013).
Tribes have not fared well under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4
(2012), which Congress enacted in the wake of Lyng and Smith v. Employment Division, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(rejecting a religious free exercise claim involving peyote use in the context of an employment discharge). See, e.g.,
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc decision rejecting a claim of
religious interference due to use of reclaimed wastewater for snowmaking on a sacred site).
Even when land managers seek to protect native religious practices, they may run into constitutional limits
imposed by the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F.
Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), aff’d, 175 F.3d 814, 816, 822 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding a voluntary rock climbing
ban at a sacred site after striking down a mandatory ban). However, managers may be able to justify protecting such
practices by classifying them as cultural, rather than religious in nature. See Nat. Arch & Bridge Ass’n v. Alston,
209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1222–23 1214 (D. Utah 2002), aff’d, 98 Fed. Appx. 711 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Park
Service signage requesting that the public not walk underneath Rainbow Bridge, noting that the agency’s effort to
discourage the public did not violate the Establishment Clause because tribal beliefs are both religious and social
and cultural in nature); Access Fund v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 499 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that
the establishment clause “does not bar the government from protecting an historically and culturally important site
simply because the site’s importance derives at least in part from its sacredness to certain groups” and upholding a
rock climbing ban near Lake Tahoe); see also ROYSTER ET AL., supra note 439, at 41–45 (reprinting the Forest
Service’s decision banning the climbing).
440
See, e.g., Peter Zwick, A Redeemable Loss: Lyng, Lower Courts and American Indian Free Exercise on Public
Lands, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 241, 252–55 (2009) (describing tribal plaintiffs’ unsuccessful record of attempting
to employ First Amendment free exercise claims to challenge federal land use policies).
441
See infra note 461.
439
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provides for diverse uses of federal lands. For example, the modern definition of multiple-use now
includes recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, and fish and wildlife, as well as natural,
scenic, scientific and historical values.442
Antimonopoly gained ground during the Disposition Era443 to become a predominant national
public ethic. From the Confederation Congress statutes of the 1780s,444 which laid the groundwork
for widespread ownership,445 through the Homestead Act Era of the late nineteenth century,446 to
the Progressive Conservation Era of the early twentieth century,447 antimonopoly was a persistent
theme in public land statutes. Antimonopoly was also evident in judicial interpretations of those
statutes, as the Supreme Court repeatedly directed courts to resolve doubts in favor of public
ownership when considering proposals to privatize public land.448
Even when Congress pursued arguably monopolistic railroad land grants beginning with the
departure of the South from Congress during the Civil War, antimonopoly policies eventually
tempered the railroad grants through the imposition of conditions aimed at limiting land sales to
See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c); see supra notes 349–51 and accompanying text. See also 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A) –
(B); supra notes 381–89 and accompanying text.
443
The Disposition Era lasted until 1916 and beyond, when the Stock-Raising Homestead Act authorized settlers to
enter 640 acres of land for grazing purposes. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291–301 (repealed 1976). After the passage of the Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934, executive withdrawals closed much of the remaining public domain to disposition. See Andrus
v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 529–33 (1980) (recounting the restrictions placed on homestead entry after the enactment of
the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934); COGGINS ET AL., supra note 370, at 106.
444
One of the first public land laws, the Northwest Ordinance, rejected hereditary land concentration and large
familial holdings that characterized the British system of inheritance and recognized public ownership of navigable
waters as essential for public use of a critical means of transport in an era of bad roads. See supra notes 33–48 and
accompanying text.
445
See, e.g., Festa, supra note 23, at 443 (describing the Northwest Ordinance as part of a republican effort to
guarantee individual property rights through rule of law in the Northwest Territories, where the Confederation
Congress hoped to encourage settlement by the yeoman, rather than to allow a regime of land speculation take hold).
446
During the Disposition era, Congress experimented for decades with various policies for selling or granting
public land and resources. Major competing considerations were revenue generation, encouraging diligent
development and bona fide settlement, and discouraging speculation. See supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text.
Advocates for the common settler achieved price reduction and preemption sales, and eventually in the Homestead
Act the right to free land, epitomizing egalitarian distribution. See supra notes 111–18 and accompanying text.
The late 1800s saw a proliferation of resource legislation reflecting antimonopoly principles. The Timber
Cutting Act authorized the free cutting of timber for mining and domestic uses (as opposed to commercial use). See
supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. The Timber and Stone Act authorized the sale of timberlands of 160
acres, limited to personal use. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. The General Mining Law, while
establishing a capture system for minerals, employed antimonopoly principles like size limits for claims and diligent
pursuit requirements. See supra notes 184–90 and accompanying text. The Unlawful Inclosures Act sought to
safeguard the ability of the general public to access the range resource on public land. See supra note 217 and
accompanying text.
447
Progressive era resource policy embraced the utilitarian ethic of the greatest good for the greatest number, an
antimonopoly principle, reflected in the Forest Service Organic Act’s directive to conserve forestlands while
furnishing a continuous supply of timber, and limiting timber cutting to dead and mature trees. See supra notes 240–
43, 246–47 and accompanying text. The language of the Act thus rejected clearcuts, a use-monopoly. See supra
notes 244–45 and accompanying text. Progressives thought development of fuel minerals on public lands and
hydropower on navigable waters should be regulated as public utilities. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
This era also saw the institution of permit-fee regulation for livestock grazing on the public lands. See supra notes
311–14 and accompanying text.
448
United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957); Andrus v, Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S.
604, 617 (1978); Watt v. W. Nuclear, Inc. 462 U.S. 36, 59 (1983).
442
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settlers.449 The first several decades of the Disposition Era gave birth to an Antimonopoly Era, as
public support for selling public lands to finance government became linked to ensuring that the
public’s resources be spread as broadly as possible.
The Progressive Era transformed antimonopoly by extending its focus to include a much
greater array of uses, including preservation and intergenerational concerns.450 Those sentiments
built on traditional American antimonopoly sentiment of maintaining public access to public
resources, preventing concentration of public resources in the hands of the few, and encouraging
dispersed uses of federal land. Over the years, the diversity of officially recognized uses has
expanded to include non-commodity uses such as recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed,
and fish and wildlife, as well as natural, scenic, scientific and historical values.451 American public
land antimonopoly policy included several measures to pursue its goals of widespread distribution
and public control, including leasing, term limits, acreage limitations, diligent pursuit
requirements, land and resource planning, protection of non-commercial uses, and land use
regulation for sustainability, intergenerational equity, and interspecies equity. 452
In the modern era, the variety of recognized uses of the public lands has swelled. The institution
of universal resource planning required public land agencies to acknowledge and prepare for
diverse users, prepare a framework for protecting those uses before being confronted with resource
proposals, and created accountability for resource allocation. 453 The Forest Service, for example,
must provide for diversity of plant and animal communities in order to meet multiple use
objectives.454 Recent Forest Service regulations require national forest plans to provide for social,
economic, and ecological sustainability. 455 Public access law has been a major antimonopoly
theme throughout, tempered by time, place, and manner restrictions.456
Although antimonopoly remains clear national policy, monopoly in public land management
has in fact been tolerated more in the last several decades than ever. For example, leasing of
offshore oil and gas has virtually ignored antimonopoly principles,457 grazing permits are almost
invariably renewed, 458 and policies aimed at promoting competition in the award of park

449

After western settlers agitated for railroad grant reform in the second half of the Nineteenth century, Congress
included homestead provisions in railroad grants that aimed to force the companies to sell land to bona fide settlers.
Failure to adhere to these antimonopoly provisions led to the forfeiture of millions of acres. See supra notes 133–
144 and accompanying text.
450
See supra notes 300–01 and accompanying text.
451
See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c); see supra notes 349–51 and accompanying text; 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (diversity);
see supra notes 381–89, and accompanying text.
452
See supra notes 286 (leasing), 326, 278, 306 (term limits), 121, 167, 290–93 (acreage limits), 190–91 (diligent
pursuit requirements), 381–89 (planning), 300–01, 365–68 (protection of non-commercial uses), 385–98 (land use
regulation for sustainability and interspecies equity).
453
See supra § V.B.
454
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
455
36 C.F.R. § 219.8 (2012). ANILCA’s protection of subsistence harvests, see supra notes 392–400 and
accompanying text, is another example of antimonopoly. Others include MUSYA, see supra note 341 and
accompanying text, NFMA’s diversity requirement, see supra notes 378–82 and accompanying text, or ANILCA’s
public land limitations, see supra note 399 and accompanying text, although courts have not interpreted these
provisions vigorously.
456
See supra § V.D.
457
See, e.g., Huber, supra note 12, at 1011–12 (describing the federal government’s routine extension of offshore
leases, and leaseholders’ invocation of lease suspensions as a tool to extend lease terms, even during moratoria).
458
See Huber, supra note 12, at 1004–05 (discussing renewal of federal grazing permits).
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concessions have not borne much fruit.459 To the extent that antimonopoly includes interspecies
and intergenerational concerns, there is also considerable blowback from states such as Utah,
which has marshaled sufficient anti-federal sentiment to enact a legally questionable challenge to
most federal land holdings in the state.460 Congressional riders considered by the 114th Congress
included numerous rollbacks of species, land, and resource protections that would reestablish
monopoly control, especially by public land graziers and oil and gas lessees.461
This effort to reestablish monopoly control by certain public land users through congressional
riders is not a new development,462 but the number and scope of the proposed riders suggested that
a new era may have been launched in which monopolistic forces now enjoy widespread currency
in Congress. This would represent a marked reversal of more than two hundred years of
congressional antimonopoly intent.
Antimonopoly policy may in fact be a prime example of widely proclaimed high ideals,
coupled with compromised implementation in relatively low visibility administrative
decisionmaking. Antimonopoly principles are sometimes frustrated through below-cost mineral
and timber sales,463 grazing permit decisions,464 and renewal of park concessions.465 Commodity
users of public lands can dominate administrative decisions like permit renewals due to the
intensity of their interest and their economic ability to participate in complex processes, coupled
with a relative lack of participation by the general public.466 Although imperfectly implemented,
459

See Kurt Repanshek, National Park Service Sitting On Half-A-Billion Dollars Of Concessions Obligations,
NATIONAL PARKS TRAVELER (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2015/03/national-park-servicesitting-half-billion-dollars-concessions-obligations26283 (explaining that four primary companies manage the Parks
Service’s concessions. The possessory interests that these companies have in parks infrastructure reaches into the
tens and hundreds of millions of dollars. Thus, competition is stifled by the high price a new concessionaire would
need to pay to buy out its predecessor).
460
See Robert B. Keiter & John Ruple, The Transfer of Public Lands Movement: Taking the ‘Public’ Out of Public
Lands (Stegner Center White Paper 2015-01), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2555922; Nick
Lawton, Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding A Gift of Federal Lands, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2014).
461
See, e.g., 2015 Anti-Environmental Budget Riders, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (June 26, 2015),
http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/2015-riders.asp#sec-lands (discussing ten public lands riders, which would: cripple
the government’s ability to acquire lands under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act; eliminate citizens’
ability to challenge BLM land use decisions in court; block implementation of Interior’s “wild lands initiative”;
authorize the Forest Service to rely on outdated forest plans; forbid the use of eminent domain in support of federal
lands management (except in the case of Florida Everglades restoration); exempt livestock grazing permit renewals
from environmental review; forbid federal land plans from limiting fishing or shooting activities if they were
allowed on January 1, 2013; permanently exempt from environmental review livestock grazing on lands replacing
those made unusable by wildfire or drought; permanently prevent BLM or the Forest Service from acquiring water
rights to protect fish and wildlife habitat and limit federal land managers’ ability to restrict activities like hydraulic
fracturing to protect waters; and block implementation or enforcement of BLM’s new fracking rule concerning oil
and gas wells to protect groundwater).
462
As examples, both the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, long the governing statute for
national forests, and the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, by which the federal government consents to state
court jurisdiction over its water right in comprehensive water adjudications, were contained in appropriations
statutes.
463
See Claire E. Sollars, Comment, Natural Resources: Federal Coal Leasing in the Powder River Basin – A Call
for Reform, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 115, 141 (1993).
464
See Huber, supra note 12, at 1004–05.
465
See Huber, supra note 12, at 1005–07 (renewal of ski-resort licenses).
466
For a classic anticipation of agency capture in the Gilded Age, see Letter of Richard S. Olney (a prominent
railroad lawyer) to Charles S. Perkins (a railroad president) (Dec. 2, 1892), reprinted in KERMIT L. HALL, ET AL.,
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 365–66 (1st ed. 1991), which aimed to assuage industry fears
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antimonopoly policies have persisted from the United States’ founding into the modern age. They
are a reflection of the nation’s republican ideals, its agrarian egalitarianism, and values of
individualism, equal opportunity, and shared access to common resources. 467 For future
Congresses to retreat from the more than two-centuries-old national commitment to antimonopoly
principles would amount to a revolutionary change in public land management policy.

concerning the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission, suggesting that the Commission would
eventually become an industry ally—“the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be . . . to take
the business and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a barrier between the railroad corporations and the people
and a sort of protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests.” For a modern example of the
workings of agency capture, see the effort of the BLM to amend its grazing regulations to reduce public
participation in grazing permit renewals, an effort which met with judicial disapproval in W. Watersheds Project v.
Kraayenbrink, 620 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming a lower court injunction).
467
Thomas Jefferson would have inserted a human right to freedom from monopoly into the Bill of Rights.
Critiquing a draft of the Constitution, he complained that it omitted “a bill of rights providing clearly & without the
aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, [and] restriction
against monopolies . . . .” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787).
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